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School Discipline Procedures:
Some Empirical Findings and Some
Theoretical Questions T
LEE E. TEITELBAUM*

Until the last ten years or so, the operation of public schools was largely
a matter for local determination, subject even to state control only in
certain respects. Recently, however, a number of federal statutes and
judicial decisions have regulated, in one way or another, the activities
of public schools,' and some of these have engendered state legislative
action also affecting local practices.2 The complexity of this regulatory
enterprise is apparent. On the one hand, legislative and judicial decisions
announce policies that are expected to produce consistent behavior at a
remote level. For that to transpire, several circumstances must concur.
The rule or desired practice must be clearly expressed. It must be known
to and understood by those charged with implementation. Local administrators must be able and willing to carry out the policy.' In addition,
t Copyright 1984 by Lee E. Teitelbaum. Photocopy reproduction of the article made
for or used by any non-profit educational institution is permitted.
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M.,
Northwestern University. This research was conducted at the Center for the Study of
Legal Policy Relating to Children of the Indiana University School of Law, and was supported by a grant from the Lilly Endowment.
Data collection for this study was designed and carried out by Ms. Susan Hillman, a
doctoral student at Indiana University and formerly Research Assistant at the Center,
who also commented very helpfully on an earlier draft of this paper. The author also wishes
to express his deep gratitude to Professor Stephen Wasby of the State University of New
York at Albany, Department of Political Science, for his thoughtful and critical suggestions. Any error remains, of course, the author's responsibility.
I E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school disciplinary procedure); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school discipline - free speech);
Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1461 (1976; Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
2 E.g., IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5-1 to -17 (1982).
See S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 231-32 (1970).
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where several agencies are responsible for administration they must agree
about their obligations and discharge them uniformly and in coordination.
On the other hand, regulation has significance for local actors whether
or not they accurately follow specific commands. While appellate courts
in particular may and should act on a piecemeal basis, program administrators ordinarily cannot. The latter must carry on comprehensive
schemes without interruption. For example, the Supreme Court held in
In re Gault4 that certain rights (the right to counsel, notice of charges,
cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination) obtain in
juvenile delinquency proceedings and expressly reserved until a later date
the applicability of other procedural entitlements, such as the rights to
bail and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.- State legislatures and lower
courts must, however, take a position on such questions in the light of
existing Supreme Court decisions which clearly refused to consider them.
Thus, utterance of a judicial decision may carry with it a penumbral effect which influences conduct in areas where no command has yet been
issued and may not be issued for a considerable period of time.
The relationship between judicial or legislative regulation and the
behavior of those affected by regulatory activity is, therefore, a complicated matter from a number of perspectives. Social and political scientists have tended to focus on compliance with stated judicial commands
by courts, although there has been some recent attention to more diffuse
consequences of judicial action. The present study, which concerns public
school disciplinary practices in Indiana, crosses these lines. The United
States Supreme Court has imposed procedural rules for short disciplinary
suspensions of students,' but has expressly declined to decide what procedures are necessary for other kinds of student disciplinary sanctions.
The Indiana legislature has gone somewhat further, specifying procedures
for expulsion and exclusion from school, but not for in-school suspension
of students.' School administrators, however, have not been able to avoid
deciding what process is required for the alternative methods of discipline
they employ. They must either abandon sanctions for which clear guidance
is lacking, which may be undesirable or even impracticable, or they must
decide, on scanty information, what probably will be required by courts
when they ultimately address the procedural requirements for those alternatives. This latter approach carries with it some significant risks, including the possibility that the action taken will not only be declared invalid but will give rise to an action for damages predicated upon violation
of a student's civil rights

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 11-12.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Indiana Due Process and Pupil Discipline Code, IND.
See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

CODE

S 20-8.1-5-8,-10 (1982).
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The ways in which schools have adapted to these situations is a central
inquiry for the study reported here. It must be said that this research
is preliminary and that much of what is reported is descriptive. However,
descriptive data regarding school practices and procedures is a necessary
first step to understanding the relationship of policy decisions to local
school activities, and these data may provoke further and more focused
investigation into this and related areas. This study also serves as a vehicle
for examining several methodological and theoretical issues associated
with research on the effect of Supreme Court decisions and other legal
rules.
I.
A.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The Legal Frameworkfor School Discipline in Indiana

Conceptually if not chronologically,9 discussion of the current legal
framework for student discipline in Indiana may begin with Goss v. Lopez, 10
in which the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional status of
disciplinary action by public school officials. Like many initial Court decisions in previously unregulated areas," Goss combined strong language
justifying the application of constitutional standards to disciplinary
decisions with a carefully circumscribed holding.
To explain why the due process clause applied at all, the majority
observed that students possess constitutional rights which they do not
"shed ... at the schoolhouse door"" and, more particularly, that suspension from school without adequate process violates both property and
liberty interests held by public school students. The property entitlement
is that created by state statutes and constitutions assuring a free education to all residents between certain ages." The liberty interest lies in
freedom from the injury to a student's "good name, reputation, honor,
or integrity" that official charges of misconduct, if sustained and made
known, can occasion." Moreover, these interests were not, in the Court's
view, of minor consequence. Because "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments ... the total exclusion
from the educational process for more than a trivial period, and certainly
if the suspension is for ten days, is a serious event in the life of the
suspended child.""
I Indiana had adopted its relatively comprehensive student code in 1971. IND. CODE 5
20-8.1-5-1 to -17 (1982). The procedure for suspension, however, was changed to comply
with Goss in 1980.
10419 U.S. 565 (1975).
" See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
" 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
" Id. at 574.

" Id. at 574-75.
11Id. at 576.
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Despite this strong language, the Court did not decide all or even many
issues concerning the process required in various school discipline situations. The holding of the case is addressed only to the "ordinary" suspension of less than ten days. The Court declined entirely to address the
range of disciplinary sanctions beyond short suspension that schools
routinely employ. In dictum, the Court observed that "Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently,
may require more formal procedures;"' 6 however, the nature of these more
formal procedures was left to a later day. Because the holding is limited
to short suspensions, procedures for corporal punishment, transfers to
other schools or programs, exclusion from extracurricular activities and
other disciplinary actions likewise went unspecified.
Goss established, therefore, the proposition that students possess constitutionally protected interests in public education which cannot be denied
without due process, but did not specify what processes are required in
any but the "usual" short suspension case. The uncertainty created by
such a decision was, if anything, heightened by Wood v. Strickland,7
decided shortly after Goss, which held that civil liability could be imposed
on a school board member who suspends a student when the official "knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected... ."" Although Wood insists that school officials "were not
charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law" but only
with good faith respect for a student's "clearly established constitutional
right," 9 this limitation affords small comfort to those educators who find
little settled by existing Supreme Court decisions."
The Indiana statutory law follows but goes considerably farther in its
coverage than existing Supreme Court decisions. With regard to "short
suspensions" (the only kind recognized by state law), Goss and the Indiana
Due Process and Pupil Discipline Code now contain identical requirements:
a student must receive (1) notice of charges facing him, which may be
informal, and if the student denies those charges, (2) a summary of the
evidence against him and (3) an informal opportunity to respond."
"
'7
"

Id. at 584.
420 U.S. 308 (1975).
Id. at 322.

19Id.

" Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) limited the damages recoverable by students
suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process.
The Court held that, in the absence of proof of actual injury resulting from suspension,
students are entitled to recover only nominal damages. However, this limitation seems

to suppose that the disciplinary action was in fact justified, but imposed without appropriate

process; presumably damages would be more readily available if the action was in fact
unjustified or if emotional or other injury associated with the deprivation of a hearing

could be established.

1 Goss, 419 U.S. at 581; IND. CODE S 20-8.1-5-6(b) (1982).
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Moreover, the statute, like Goss, presumes that the hearing will be conducted prior to disciplinary action unless emergent circumstances demand
immediate removal of the child from school premises.' The present Code
provisions, enacted in August of 1980 and obviously designed to track
the requirements of Goss, came into force just before this study was
conducted.
Indiana legislation also addresses the expulsion and exclusion of
students. While the most that one can say as a constitutional matter is
that expulsion or exclusion must be accompanied by at least the process
required for short suspensions and probably by some unstated increment
beyond that, the Due Process and Pupil Discipline Code does specify procedures for these sanctions.3 These rules, many of which have been in
place since 1971, will be described in detail below;' for present purposes,
it is enough to say that the Code contains an extremely formal and comprehensive set of requirements which go well beyond what is ordinarily
thought necessary for administrative hearings.
Finally, there are some forms of discipline which remain unregulated
either by Supreme Court or state legislative action. The most commonly
invoked of these is in-school suspension, which involves exclusion from
regular classes but not from school premises. Transfer of students to alternative school programs is likewise determined entirely by local practice,
as are deprivations of school privileges and exclusions from extracurricular
activities.
B.

Research Design

Local school disciplinary actions in Indiana are governed in some
respects by federal judicial policy and state legislation, in others by state
regulation only, and in yet other areas remain unregulated by central
authority. The research methodology gathered information about sanctions and procedures in all three categories. With regard to the first of
these areas, we were interested in knowing whether "short suspension"
practices in local districts were consistent with Supreme Court decisi6ns
and state law across schools of different sizes and in different locations
(urban and rural) within the state. We were also concerned with factors
that are hypothetically related to local acceptance of federal or state policy
concerning school discipline. Information regarding knowledge of judicial
decisions, statutory rules, and local practices were collected from principals, counselors, and teachers in the sample schools. These largely
descriptive data tell us something about the context in which rules
I Goss, 419 U.S. at 582; IND. CODE
2 IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5-8 (1982).

S

20-8.1-5-6(c) (1982).

" See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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governing disciplinary action are introduced and provide information about
their consistency (if not compliance) with centrally promulgated rules.
With respect to matters regulated by state law but not Supreme Court
decision, such as expulsions, the initial area of interest concerned the kinds
of rules adopted and their relationship to Supreme Court dicta, if not
to its holdings. In addition, we gathered information concerning local
knowledge of, and consistency in practice with, state law across schools
of various sizes and settings.
For sanctions which are governed by neither judicial decisions nor the
state code, we were primarily concerned with investigating current incidence and practice in Indiana. It might be supposed that unregulated
alternatives will be preferred to regulated forms of discipline at least
where regulation is not welcome at the local level. Because centralized
governance of school disciplinary action is a relatively recent development and might be thought undesirable by local school officials, it seemed useful to inquire whether sanctions not yet addressed by the Court
or the legislature were widely used.
C. Population and Sample
Research was carried out in fifteen Indiana high schools during the
Spring of 1981. Only high schools were sampled; combined junior and senior
high schools were excluded from the population because of the likelihood
that different sanctions, procedures, and lines of authority would exist
for the various age levels. Schools were selected on the basis of location
(urban and rural)n and size (small, medium, and large).26 Three schools
were selected for each category except that of "small urban" schools. The
latter category was not filled because no urban public schools in Indiana
were listed as having classes falling into our range for "small" schoolsY
Selection of schools for each category was based on random selection from
a list of public schools published by the North Central Association.
Although we were prepared to substitute for schools which declined to
cooperate, this was necessary in only one instance.
Within each school, various measures were administered to the principal, counselor, and three teachers. In most instances, the principal himself
Urban communities were defined for research purposes as those having a population
of more than 50,000 and rural communities included those with fewer than 25,000 residents.
"' Small schools were defined operationally as those with fewer than 150 students per
class, medium schools as those with 200-450 students per class, and large schools had more
than 500 pupils per class.
The sample population accordingly is:
Location
School
Rural
Urban
Population
3
Small
3
3
Medium
3
3
Large
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participated; in a few schools, however, an assistant principal was chosen
because he was the official primarily responsible for disciplinary matters.
In two of the large urban schools, a dean of students (having significant
disciplinary responsibility) also participated. Assistant principals and deans
were counted with principals, however, for reporting purposes. The
teachers were selected by the principals of the schools, and we cannot
exclude the possibility that the latter chose teachers believed to be sympathetic with the school's disciplinary activities. Any actual bias of this
kind is, however, largely irrelevant to our study; as it happened, teachers
rarely answered questions regarding practice or knowledge in the same
way as the principals who chose them.
D.

Measures Used

1.

Code Adoption

One of the first measures of response to judicial policy is found in
legislative activity at the state and local level.28 The Indiana Due Process
and Pupil Discipline Code was examined with a view towards its consistency with Supreme Court decisions in areas directly addressed by
judicially created rules (i.e., short suspensions) and those where judicial
decisions are only suggestive. The first of these provides some measure
of consistency with governing judicial policy; the second, a measure of
the way in which the legislature anticipated yet unannounced policy determinations. Finally, analysis of code provisions is necessary to determine
the fit between local practices and statewide legislative policy.
2.

Practices

We were interested in examining several aspects of current disciplinary
practice in public schools. The first aspect concerns the kinds of sanctions now imposed by schools. From an impact perspective, it is important to know whether suspensions from school are routinely used after
Goss v. Lopez or whether other kinds of sanctions are employed which
may not be perceived as importing requirements of procedural formality.
If new devices for handling misconduct have been introduced, their
characters may be significant in judging whether substantive changes in
discipline have resulted from imposition of procedural demands. For
descriptive purposes, it is also important to determine the relative incidence of various sanctions across schools and the kinds of cases in which
they are used.
The second aspect of practices studied concerns the use of procedures
in connection with disciplinary action. More particularly, it is important
See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 294-95 (1977).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:547

to know whether judicially or legislatively-imposed rules are followed and,
equally significant, what procedures are followed where sanctions determined by courts or codes are not involved.
Investigation of these practices would have been conducted best through
participant observation of a large number of cases. This strategy was
not available because "hearings" are not scheduled in advance and because
we could not place observers in the schools on a daily basis. We decided
to use, as a second best choice, an interview technique emphasizing
vignettes describing students and their misconduct.' All respondents (principals, counselors, and teachers) were asked, given the situation set forth
in the vignette, what disciplinary action would be taken in their schools
and what procedures, if any, would be followed in each situation. Six basic
fact patterns, with variations by gravity of offense and student's prior
record, were presented to each participant. In order to avoid any effect
associated with the sequence of questions, the order of presentation for
each respondent was determined by shuffling the cards containing the
vignettes.
As a second step, we also obtained information on disciplinary action
over the 1979-1980 academic year from each school. In most cases these
data came from school records, although in a few cases, where records
were unavailable, we had to rely on estimates by school administrators.
3.

Knowledge of Procedural Rules

Because this study is concerned in part with consistency between local
practice and judicial or legislative rules, we investigated what educators
know of those rules and their sources. To the extent one is interested
in compliance, data on knowledge is essential. Compliance with judicial
or other commands presupposes knowledge of those commands together
with conforming behavior. In addition, we sought to investigate whether
knowledge of various legal requirements is differently distributed among
school districts and among school personnel. Accordingly, onsite interviews with principals, counselors and teachers were conducted to ascertain their knowledge and understanding of Supreme Court decisions and
state laws regarding student discipline.
All respondents were also asked whether procedural requirements imposed constraints on their activities. Perception of such constraints offers
a rough measure of attitudes toward procedural notions in the school
setting.

I

On the use of vignettes in interview research, see Rossi, Vignette Analysis: UncoverQUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE SOCIAL
RESEARCH 176-96 (R.K. Merton, J.S. Coleman & P.H. Rossi, eds. 1979).

ing the Normative Structure of Complex Judgments, in
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II.

DISCIPLINE IN INDIANA HIGH SCHOOLS:
SANCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

A. Short Suspensions and Compliance: Consistency with Judicial
and Legislative Regulation
It is convenient to begin examination of disciplinary practices and procedures with short suspensions from school because the legal rules
governing that sanction are clearest. All suspensions in Indiana are short
suspensions; any exclusion from school beyond five days is treated as an
expulsion.' In the usual case, suspension is itself a sanction, but it may
also be invoked as a precursor to expulsion. A student for whom the latter
is proposed will routinely be suspended while the procedure for expulsion is initiated and, ordinarily, until the expulsion hearing is commenced.
Presumably, a suspension will become an expulsion in those cases where
the student does not request a hearing to oppose the latter penalty.
1. Incidence of Suspensions
Suspension from school has long been the primgry formal disciplinary
action invoked for misbehaving students31 and as Table I indicates, suspension remains an important disciplinary sanction in Indiana.

IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.6(a) (1982).
2, In 1975, the year Goss v. Lopez was decided, it was estimated that 10% of all school
children were suspended at least once during the school year and that an additional fraction was dismissed or discharged from school under threat of suspension. A REPORT OF
THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND OF THE WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, INC., SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 10

(1975).
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TABLE 1
Proportion of Disciplinary Sanctions to Student Population
by Size and Settings of Schools
Size and Setting
Of School
Small (Rural)

In-School
Suspension
N
%
1%
(3)
1
2 DNH

3
01
Medium (Rural) 1 (54)
2 (410)
Med. (Urban)

3
1
2
3

Large (Urban)

Total

Expulsion
%
N
<1%
<1

(10)
(5)

2.5%
1.0

(3)
(59)
(24)

(1) <1
(8) <1%
1.6
(22)

(4)
(121)
(456)

(5) <1
(15) 1.0%
(12)1 <1

1.0
12.7%
33.8
7.2

(84)
(485) 34.2%
(163) 11.2
(205) 15.8

<1
6.2%
<1

(10) <1
5.9
7.6%
25.5% (108)
(151) 10.4
_2
3.9
(51)
(154) 11.9
(200) 7.4%
-5
8.5
(140)
DNH
5.3
(110)
DNH

3 (69)
1 (362)
2

Large (Rural)

5.6%
30.4

Total
N %

Suspension
N
%
1.5%
(6)
(4) <1

6.6%
1 (434) 21.8% (132)
5.2
(106)
2 (405) 20.0
(304) 15.7
3 DNH
(1408)
(1891)

(1)
(1)

-4

(67)

1.4% (239) 8.8%
(185) 11.2
2.7
8.6
(177)
3.2

(49)
(10)
(16)

2.5%
<1
<1

(39)
(45)

(291)

(615)
(521)
(320)

30.9%
25.7
16.6

(3590)

1. Students are excluded from class and kept in office for one to three days, but no record
of such actions is kept.
2. Principal says that school does not have in-school suspension program but teachers may
exclude a student for "a couple or three days."
3. Alternative schools are used rather than expulsion, and children over 16 are allowed to
withdraw from school.
4. For children over 16, withdrawal is the usual outcome.
5. Principal reports that in-school suspension is used "to a small degree," but they apparently
are not recorded in school disciplinary records.

The fifteen sample schools imposed in-school suspension, suspension
from school, and expulsion on 3,590 occasions during the 1980-1981 school
year.2 These schools serve a total population of some 21,350 students;
" These three classes of disciplinary action cover virtually all formal sanctions reported
by our respondents. We gathered data on corporal punishment, but these are not set out
in Table 1 because only one school reported using this sanction. The principals and teachers
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thus the overall formal discipline rate for those sample schools was
16.8%. 3 Expulsions, however, are rarely ordered in any of these schools,
and formal disciplinary action is largely distributed between short suspensions from school and in-school suspension. The former accounted for 1,400
instances of disciplinary action, or 6.6% of the student population. Inschool suspensions, which do not involve removal from school premises
but only from regular classrooms, will be discussed separately. It is important to note that this sanction accounted for 8.9% of disciplinary action
at all schools, even though only ten of the fifteen schools had adopted
this relatively recent alternative to expulsion and out-of-school suspension of students. If in-school suspension is combined with the traditional
short suspension, these forms of temporary exclusion produced 3,300
disciplinary actions, or a sanction rate of 15.5%. It may or may not be
true that, prior to adoption of in-school suspensions as a disciplinary alternative, most or all of these pupils would have been temporarily excluded
from school. However, suspensions of various kinds clearly remain a
common method of student discipline, affecting a substantial number of
students in Indiana as well as nationally.
2.

Short Suspension Procedures

Both Goss v. Lopez and the Indiana Due Process and Pupil Discipline
Code now require that students faced with suspension from school be
advised of the charges against them and, if those charges are denied, provided with a summary of the evidence regarding their misconduct and
an informal opportunity to respond to the charges prior to removal from
school. Twelve of the seventeen principals and deans (71%), when asked
to describe the procedures followed in suspension cases, mentioned all
of the rights required by Goss and state law. 4 Another two omitted one
interviewed stated that this penalty is used at the middle-school level, but not in high
schools. We have included within the category of in-school suspension, however, action
called a transfer to alternative schools. This was done because, in most of the schools stating
that they used this sanction, the alternative school program was substantially the same
as or identical to programs called "in-school suspension" by other respondents.
I The "sanction rate" here and in other instances only reports the incidence of sanctions not the percentage of students sanctioned. We did not have access to records that
would allow us to say how many disciplinary actions involved repeat offenders.
34
Suspension Procedures
All

Some

Not

Don't

Rights

Rights

Mentioned

Know

Principals

70.6% (12)

11.8% (2)

17.6%

(3)

Counselors

28.6%

(4)

14.2% (2)

57.1%

(8)

Teachers

17.8%

(8)

8.8% (4)

X2= 30.570
7r= .01

60.0% (27)

0

0
13.3% (6)

Two caveats concerning these data, pointing in different directions, should be stated.
The first is that the data here are self-reported, which presents significant problems of
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of these requirements,35 and three principals did not mention any of the
procedures called for by judicial and legislative mandate. Moreover, all
fourteen principals and deans who mentioned the Goss procedures also
mentioned that these procedures were employed prior to suspension of
students, as Goss further requires.
If we accept the principals' responses as substantially accurate, it
appears that Indiana high schools generally handle short suspensions in
a fashion consistent with Goss v. Lopez. The easiest explanation for the
considerable degree of consistency is that the majority of schools are complying with judicial and legislative rules: that is, following those rules
because they are authoritative declarations of law. There are impediments
to this conclusion that will be discussed later' but even if compliance
can be assumed, one is left to ask why schools have followed the law
accuracy. See Stapleton, Ito & Aday, Informant Errorin a Court Survey (Paper presented
to the Southern Sociological Society, Louisville, Ky., Apr. 1981). See also, Mauldin & Marks,
Problems of Responses in Enumerative Surveys, 15 AM. Soc. REV. 649 (1950). While we know
what school personnel say they do or is done, it is more difficult to state confidently that
what is reported in fact reflects what happens in these schools. Answers by school officials
may, for example, reflect school policy rather than actual practice. See, e.g., K. DOLBEARE

& P.

HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS

32-33, 43-45 (1971). We tried to anticipate this

difficulty by securing multiple responders in all schools (principal, counselor, and three
teachers); however, it developed that only principals even claim routine familiarity with
the procedures followed for school disciplinary matters. Moreover, it seems to be true that
only principals and deans are involved regularly in the school disciplinary process. Teachers
act only as initiators of disciplinary decisions; their affirmative responsibility ends when
the child is sent to an administrative office. Counselors likewise play little significant part
in most disciplinary decisions, although they may, after discipline has been imposed, act
as advisors to students or their families.
Accordingly, the data in this section represent what principals say takes place in their
schools, without any reliable source of corroboration. On the other hand, the methodology
used required respondents to describe, without prompting, what was done procedurally
in the schools, and the vignettes offered them open-ended opportunities to describe both
the action that might be taken and the procedures that would be used. This open-ended
technique required principals and others to base their answers upon their knowledge and
experience in the conduct of these matters, which offers some basis for believing that the
responses provide a reasonably accurate measure of familiarity with operating practices
and procedures.
35 In one case, the summary of evidence was not mentioned; in the other,
opportunity
to explain was omitted.
" We also collected responses from counselors and teachers concerning suspension procedures in their schools. Their answers disagreed significantly from those of their principals. Less than 30% of the counselors and less than 20 percent of the teachers mentioned
the three required steps when asked about disciplinary process in their schools. Approximately the same proportions mentioned that these steps were taken before suspension
rather than after the fact. Interpretation of this disparity in responses presents some difficulty. Inconsistency might indicate inaccuracy in the principals' reports of procedures
in their schools and particularly that the level of compliance with legal requirements is
lower than their answers claim. However, the interviews made clear that in fact few teachers
and counselors are actually involved in disciplinary matters and that they had little firsthand knowledge of the procedures employed within their schools. Accordingly, inconsistency
of response probably indicates lack of knowledge rather than inconsistent knowledge or
experience with disciplinary procedures.
"7These impediments will be discussed in section III(A) of this article.
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despite contrary predictions by a number of thoughtful commentators. 8
To answer this question, it is important to note that predictions of noncompliance rested on several plausible assumptions. Initially, there was
doubt about whether all schools and personnel would learn about Goss
and its requirements 9 This was a reasonable doubt to entertain, perhaps
especially for small and rural school districts which may be isolated from
the flow of relevant information. Secondly, there was reason to believe
that school personnel would resent the intrusion that Goss imposed on
their activities and would find its requirements burdensome. 0 Compliance
assumes not only knowledge of but willingness to follow legal rules, and
the second element might produce non-compliance even where the first
exists.
Our survey suggests that skepticism about dissemination of Goss' requirements was to some extent well-founded. It appears that, five years
after Goss, knowledge of both the decision and its specific rules remains
incomplete. Table 2 indicates the reported knowledge of the Goss decision itself; not by name, but by whether respondents know that the
Supreme Court had ever established rules for short suspensions.

1 It was widely predicted, after Goss, that some schools would not know of the decision
or choose to ignore it, while others would truncate the hearing elements so as to render
them merely perfunctory. E.g., Kirp, Proceduralismand Bureaucracy:Due Process in the
School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV.841,860 (1976). This perception is strengthened by experience
with local school resistance to other Supreme Court decisions. See S. WASBY, supranote
3, at 129-33; Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reactionto the "S chempp"
Decision, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 110 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d
ed. 1973); but see Hazard, Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland: Some Implicationsfor
School Practice,4 J.L. & EDUC. 605 (1975); Buss, Implicationsof Goss v. Lopez and Wood v.
Strickland for Professional Discretion and Liability in Schools, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 567, 570 (1975)
(Goss requires "only the most minimal" process).
" See Kirp, supra note 38, at 860. It has frequently been pointed out that dissemination
of Supreme Court decisions cannot be taken for granted. Knowledge varies with the nature
of the audience, the methods of communication, and other factors. See S. WASBY. supra
note 3, at 83, 99; R.M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE 58-95 (1967); see also Levin,
ConstitutionalLaw and Obscene Literature:An Investigation of Bookseller Censorship Practice, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 119, 132 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d
ed. 1973) ("The lines of communication connecting appellate courts, trial courts, political
elites and booksellers may be so tenuous and haphazard that policy messages emanating
from state capitals either become garbled or peter out entirely before reaching the local
bookstore.").
" Experience with school prayer decisions provides one instance of reluctance of local
schools to follow judicial policy. See sources cited supra note 38. Goss may be perceived
as interfering with the character-shaping enterprise that most schools consider a primary
task, as casting doubt on the fairness of teachers and administrators, as impeaching the
authority of school personnel, and as impeding maintenance of order in the school. See
Kirp, supra note 38, at 854-59; P. GRAUL & J.W. JONES. STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
REVERSED: CURRENT TRENDS IN SCHOOL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

(1976).
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TABLE 2
Knowledge of Supreme Court Decision
on Short Suspensions by Occupation and
Size and Setting of Schools
Knew of Decision
Principals

(N = 17) Counselors (N = 15)

Teachers

(N = 45)

Size of School
100%

(3)

33%

(1)

13%

(1)

83%
Medium
50%
Large
Setting of School
80%
Rural

(5)
(4)

17%
0

(1)
(0)

11%
11%

(2)
(2)

(8)

11%

(1)

11%

(3)

57/o

(4)

17%

(1)

11/o

(2)

Small

Urban

As this Table indicates, only twelve of seventeen principals (70.6%/o) knew
that the Supreme Court had decided a case dealing with suspension procedures, and virtually no teachers or counselors knew of such a decision.
Contrary to what might plausibly have been supposed, however, neither
size nor setting of school is strongly related to knowledge. Indeed, it appears that knowledge of the existence of the decision among administrators is somewhat greater in smaller schools in both rural and urban settings.
The same general pattern holds, moreover, when we asked those
respondents who knew of Goss to state its requirements. Only seven of
the twelve principals who knew of Goss, and of the seventeen principals
overall (41/o), revealed accurate knowledge of what Goss requires.4 1 As
with knowledge of Goss itself, no difference in accurate knowledge exists
across schools of different sizes and settings.
The following table summarizes these data.
Accurate Knowledge of Suspension Procedures
by Principals
Principals
All Principals
With Knowledge
(1N=17)
(N=12)
Size of School
6'7% (2)
67% (2)
Small
540% (3)
60/o (3)
Medium
2 5% (2)
50% (2)
Large
Setting of School
5 0% (5)
63% (5)
Rural
2 9% (2)
50% (2)
Urban
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If only forty-one percent of the school administrators knew accurately
what Goss requires, but seventy-one percent followed its procedures,42
the basis for adopting those procedures must come from a source other
than the judicial decision. The obvious alternative is state law, which imposes the same process elements as Goss. And, in fact, all but one of the
principals and deans in our school population (94%) did describe accurately
the state law requirements for suspension.
The consistency of practice with judicial policy that we found in Indiana seems to be attributable to knowledge of the state code rather than
of Goss. In states without a code that closely follows Goss, and where
knowledge of Supreme Court decisions is as low as it was in our sample
schools, the skepticism expressed shortly after Goss may well be justified.
Knowledge of procedural requirements, from whatever source, does not
by itself explain behavior consistent with those requirements. It was also
hypothesized that some school officials who knew of the Supreme Court
rules might resist their implementation. This same hypothesis might apply
to legislative rules, to the extent they appeared to burden principals and
school boards in their professional activities. When our data were collected in the spring of 1981, however, principals did not perceive these
procedural rules as severe impediments to discharge of their administrative responsibilities. We asked respondents whether they viewed
school disciplinary procedures as a constraint on their actions and found,
with some surprise, that only slightly more than one-third of the principals and teachers so regarded them.
TABLE 3
Do Procedural Rules for Discipline
Impose Constraints on Your Actions?

Occupation

Yes

No

Principal
Counselor
Teacher

35.5% (6)
46.7% (7)
35.6% (16)

64.7/o (11)
53.3% (8)
64.4% (29)

The infrequency of constraint felt by those imposing discipline is particularly striking because the question addresses not only the requirements
for short suspensions but also the highly elaborate process applicable to
expulsions. Over time, therefore, the anxiety widely believed to attend
Goss may have waned or even disappeared.
Several further factors may also contribute to the acceptance by Indiana

42

See supra text at note 34.
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high schools of these procedural rules. One element is the genuinely
rudimentary nature of the rules themselves. When initial emotions have
cooled, it is difficult to view what Goss requires as a serious obstacle to
disciplinary action. A second factor may be that the Supreme Court has
not added to the requirements imposed on schools since the Goss decision itself; indeed, the two most recent decisions declined to extend even
Goss' minimal process to corporal punishment43 and to academic penalties
invoked by educational institutions." If Goss might initially have been
resisted because of what it seemed to threaten by way of further regulation, that apprehension has doubtless lessened over recent years. Finally,
the emergence of in-school suspensions as a formal but unregulated alternative sanction may have diminished the sense of constraint in some
schools. To the extent that schools can continue to act informally in a
considerable number of its disciplinary matters, imposition of minimal
requirements for some other sanctions seems less onerous.
B. Expulsions
1.

Incidence

As Table 1 indicated, expulsions (including any suspension from school
for more than five days) are relatively infrequent. Only five of the sample schools employed that sanction for more than one percent of the student population and only one school for more than three percent. Whether
the rate of expulsion can be called low is another matter, however. Because
expulsion is the most serious step that a school can take, any significant
rate of expulsion may be regarded as serious. Moreover, expulsion constitutes a significant proportion of all disciplinary actions in some schools,
as the following table reveals.

" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
" University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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TABLE 4
Relative Frequency of Sanctions

1

In-School
Suspension
(3)
30%

Short
Suspension
(6)
60%

Total
Expulsion
(1) 100% (10)
100

2
3

DNHT
0

80%
750

(4)
(3)

20%
250

(1)
(1)

1
2
3

45%
90%
82%

(54)
(410)
(69)

49%
5%
12%

(59)
(24)
(10)

7%
5%
6%

(8)
(22)
(5)

101%*(121)
100% (456)
(84)
100%

Medium (Urban) 1

75%

(362)

22%

(108)

3%

(15)

100% (485)

2
3

0
75%

(151)
(51)

7%
0

(12)

(154).

93%
25%

100%
100%

1

0

84%

(200)

16%

(39)

100% (239)

2
3

DNH
DNH

76%
63%

(140)
(110)

24%
38%

(45)
(67)

100% (185)
101%*(177)

22% (132)
1 71% (434)
20% (106)
2 78% (405)
95% (304)
3
DNH
*Percents do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
tDHN = Does not have.

8%
2%
5%

(49)
(10)
(16)

101%*(615)
100% (521)
100% (320)

School
Small (Rural)

Medium (Rural)

Large (Rural)

Large (Urban)

1000
100%

(5)
(4)

(163)
(205)

The relative frequency of expulsion varies considerably among schools,
although in only large rural schools does that sanction involve a large
number of students.
It should be said also that the manner of treating and recording expulsions in some schools diminishes the reported incidence of this sanction.
Although the Indiana School Discipline Code establishes a number of
grounds for expulsion,45 truancy seems to be a major reason for that sanction. In the large rural school with sixty-seven expulsions, for example,
fifty-three are truancy cases. Interview and vignette data reveal that two
of the medium sized urban schools handle truancy matters differently,
however. In one, children over sixteen years of age are given a choice
of withdrawal from school or attendance at an alternative school program,

' IND. CODE S 20-8.1-54 (1982) (This provision sets forth the grounds for expulsion or suspension, including use of violence, force, threat, passive resistance or other conduct constituting
an interference with school purposes, damage or attempt to damage or steal school property, damage to or stealing of private property on school grounds or during an educational
function off school grounds, causing or threatening physical injury, possessing or being
under the influence of drugs, and a variety of other forms of misconduct).
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whereas truant children under sixteen are sent to the alternative school.
The alternative school is a one-half day program within the school, but
subject to a different curriculum. Neither withdrawal nor assignment to
the alternative school is treated as an expulsion, no "due-process" hearing is held, and the expulsion rate falls accordingly (in this case, to zero).
In a second medium urban school, truant students over sixteen are simply encouraged to withdraw, without the filing of a notice of expulsion.
This method also reduces the incidence of formal expulsions.
Accordingly, the expulsion rates reflect as much about reporting practices and internal devices for dealing with truant children as they do about
the use of the sanction itself. The reported expulsion rate does not reflect
all children whose withdrawal from school is prompted by misconduct,
but only those who are still within compulsory attendance age limits or
wish to continue despite allegations of misconduct. Unfortunately, we did
not have access to withdrawal records and thus do not know how many
students accepted permanent removal rather than insist upon use of
expulsion procedures.
2.

Procedures

It is not possible to speak of "compliance" with federal judicial policy
in connection with expulsion procedures, at least above a rudimentary
level. The Supreme Court has not yet decided what procedures must
accompany that sanction, although something beyond the Goss requirements probably is necessary. The Indiana Due Process and Pupil
Discipline Code does, however, specify procedures to be used for expulsions and consistency with those norms can be evaluated. The current
requirements, many of which have been in place since 1971, are highly
elaborate. The first step involves submission of written charges by the
principal to the superintendent of schools. If the superintendent decides
that there are reasonable grounds for investigation, he is required to
appoint a hearing examiner within a specified period. The examiner must
then send a statement to the pupil and his or her parents explaining the
procedure for initiating a hearing and advising them of the violation claimed, the acts constituting the violation, a summary of the evidence to be
presented against the student, the penalty requested by the principal,
the hearing procedures used in the event of challenge by the student,
and their substantive rights to representation, discovery of records and
witnesses, and to the hearing itself. If the student requests a hearing,
that will be held upon a record (by short-hand reporter or audio or videotape, supplied by the school). The student is also entitled to findings concerning both behavior and sanction, which will be reviewed by the
46
superintendent.
" Id. S 20-8.1-5-8.
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The hearing itself is a highly formalized procedure, with considerably
more protection for the student than is usually true of administrative
hearings. The pupil has not only the rights listed above, but also rights
to presentation of evidence, sworn testimony, and to discovery of the
evidence to be used against him. The hearing is closed for the protection
of the student's privacy. Most remarkably, the child is entitled to the
privilege of remaining silent throughout, coupled with an express right
not to be punished or threatened with punishment for refusing to testify.
Moreover, there is a stated right to a severance of hearings in the event
that more than one student is involved and it appears that prejudice might
result from a joint hearing. Finally, provision is made for a right to appeal.
The only concession to notions of informality usual in administrative hearings lies in the provision that the hearing examiner is not bound by rules
7
of evidence or courtroom procedure.
Table 5 describes the extent to which principals mentioned various
expulsion procedures when asked to recall the rights associated with that
penalty.48

" Id. 5 20-8.1-5-10.
"s We also asked counselors and teachers about the procedures followed in expulsion
cases in their schools. As with suspensions, however, it seems that teachers are generally
unfamiliar with those procedures, largely because they take no active part in expulsion
matters. Indeed, this is even more true for expulsions than was so for suspensions, since
the former are handled, in one teacher's words, "downtown."
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TABLE 5
Expulsion Procedures Reported by
Principals and Deans (N=16)
Percent

No.

93.8
93.8
100.0

15
15
16

Notice of Rights

87.5

14

Discovery Rights
Summary of Evidence
Discovery of Affidavits
Identity of Witnesses
All

31.3
31.3
37.4
31.3

5
5
6
5

93.8
93.8
37.5
56.3
31.3
25.0
100.0
68.8
43.8

15
15
6
9
5
4
16
11
7

62.5

10

Preliminary Rights
Written Charges
Hearing Examiner
Notice of Hearing

Hearing Rights
Hearing
Representation
Record
Closed Hearing
To be Heard
Silence
Sworn Evidence
Produce Witnesses
Presence
Right to Appeal

In addition, several rights were mentioned fewer than four times by the
principals, and some were not mentioned at all. Among these are the rights
to a severance of hearings, not to be punished for failure to testify at
the hearing, and to articulated findings of fact and recommendations for
sanction.
In view of the complex expulsion requirements set forth by Indiana
law and the open-ended question format, the principals' responses in most
areas are striking in their consistency with state law. All or all but one
or two of the sixteen principals and deans reported use of the Code's
preliminary procedures for initiating the process and notifying the child
and parents of their rights, for which these respondents bear some responsibility themselves. In addition, all or all but one mentioned the chief
characteristics of the expulsion hearing: the hearing itself, the right to
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representation, and the use of sworn testimony. Significant numbers also
mentioned the student's right to produce witnesses (69%), to appeal (63%1o),
and to a closed hearing (56%/o). The rights least often mentioned had to
do with discovery of evidence, the right to be heard, and the right to
silence.
Even as an indication of knowledge of state law, the rate of accurate
responses by principals and deans would be impressive. As a measure
of practice, the results are even more remarkable. It is also possible that,
for several reasons, these respondents underreported the extent of compliance. One reason is the interview technique used. Not only may
administrators have forgotten procedures that in fact are used, but they
may also have collapsed categories of rights that we (and the Code) considered separate. For example, a respondent who said there was a right
to a hearing might have assumed that a hearing necessarily entails the
rights to be present and to be heard; having said the first, he may well
have assumed that he reported the others too.
In evaluating the reported compliance rate, it is also important to
remember that expulsions are administered primarily by hearing examiners rather than by principals. The latter group might well be unfamiliar with various procedures used, or not know that those procedures
were required by statute rather than imposed by examiners as a matter
of discretion. Accordingly, we interviewed school superintendents (who
may act as hearing examiners) and independent hearing examiners in the
sample districts concerning the procedures used in expulsion cases. It
was, unfortunately, difficult to arrange onsite interviews with these
officials and, in the result, a telephone survey was used in which
respondents were asked whether specific statutory procedures were
followed. Principals or hearing examiners from fourteen of the fifteen
districts agreed to the telephone interview, and virtually all stated that
they followed every practice required by the state code. The few deviations from this response pattern are insignificant: one respondent said
that he did not allow discovery of the witnesses against the pupil, two
said they did not place witnesses on oath, and three required greater
formality by forbidding hearsay evidence during expulsion proceedings.
In summary, it seems that at least the initial and the most important
procedures, according to both principals and superintendents or hearing
examiners, are followed in most if not all of the school districts surveyed.
Whether rights such as discovery, silence without punishment, and the
like are similarly respected is harder to state with confidence. While virtually all superintendents and hearing examiners reported compliance with
those rights, we have only occasional confirmation from a second source.
On the other hand, the lack of confirmatory evidence from principals
regarding these rights may be attributed to lack of recall at the time
or to the assumption that one stated right necessarily implied other rights.
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The degree of formal compliance reported by our respondents is particularly significant because of the complex and technical procedure required in Indiana. It may be, however, that compliance is possible because
the elaborate mechanism for expulsion is used only rarely. The creation
of a procedural scheme by judicial or legislative command does not
necessarily mean that it will be employed by those for whom it was
established. Lack of knowledge, real or apparent inconvenience, and the
wish to avoid confrontation with authority, among other factors, may lead
the presumed beneficiaries of due process hearings not to initiate the
use of those procedures.49 David Kirp, one of the most astute observers
in the school law area, suggested that even the informal procedures mandated by Goss might not often be pursued by students.
Even if Goss is not ignored, few hearings may in fact be held. In other
noncriminal law contexts where the Supreme Court has established
a right to due process, the Court' has not required that the hearing
itself take place, but only that notice and the opportunity for a hearing
be provided. That opportunity has been infrequently utilized by those
who potentially might benefit from it. For example, a mere 6 percent
of those denied welfare benefits or stricken from the welfare rolls
request a hearing. 0
If this prediction is plausible for informal proceedings, which take place
within the relatively familiar setting of the local school, it seems even
more so for formal expulsion procedures conducted by the school
superintendent or hearing examiner. Accordingly, we gathered data on
the frequency with which students faced with expulsion requested due.
process hearings and the rate of expulsion after a hearing. Only medium
and large schools are included, because of the low incidence of this sanction (never more than one) in small rural schools.

" See, e.g., Handler & Hollingsworth, Reforming Welfare: The Constraints of the
Bureaucracy and the Clients, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1167, 1174-76 (1970).

-1 Kirp, supra note 38, at 861. The same view was proposed by another careful observer
of schools and law: "[Tihe cost to most students of launching a challenge [to disregard of
Goss] is very great indeed. They are "in" the system, part of an ongoing set of relationships. Disapproval of a student's conduct by teachers, counselors, and administrators can
be visited upon the student in countless painful and legally unprotected ways." Buss, supra
note 38, at 574.
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TABLE 6
Percentage of Expelled Students
Requesting Hearing and Expelled
After Hearing

Medium Rural

Medium Urban

Large Rural

Large Urban

Average

Number

% Requesting

% Expelled

1
2
3
1
2
3

Expelled
8
22
5
15
12
0

Hearing
75
30
20
9
5
100**

After Hearing
90
100
100
90*
90*
33*

1
2
3
1

39
45
67
49

22 x
20
20
5

75
75
75
90*

2

10

45

75x

3

16

71
34.75

50
78.75

*Includes attendance cases.
**The hearing officer in this district encourages students and parents to request a hearing.
The officer holds a conference with the student and parents to discuss the hearing procedure and their rights, although the letter required by law is also sent. The hearing officer
attributes the 100%h hearing request rate to this process.
xEstimate by superintendent or hearing examiner.

Overall, slightly more than one-third of the expelled students requested
a hearing prior to that decision. In absolute terms, this rate is low, confirming Professor Kirp's hypothesis. Relatively, however, it is considerably
higher than that for welfare beneficiaries adversely affected by agency
decisions" and somewhat higher than the rate of appeals from adverse
determinations of eligibility for disability benefits." It is also significantly
higher than the rate of requests for hearings by unsuccessful social security disability claimants who are denied benefits upon initial request.'
1, Kirp, supra note 38, at 861.
2 It has been estimated that there were 38,000 cessations of disability benefits in 1971
and 10,941 requests for consideration, a challenge rate of 29%. Richardson v. Wright, 405
U.S. 208, 224 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:Some Theoretical and LitigationNotes
on The Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772, 784 (1974).
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Several factors might influence this request rate in different ways. On
the one hand, lack of information about the availability of review, often
a problem in other settings, seems not to arise here if we believe the
principals and superintendents who say that notices are routinely sent
to children and parents when expulsion is sought." And, unlike some other
settings, it seems unlikely that the pupil and his family are concerned
with preserving goodwill between child and school, since expulsion will
terminate the relationship between them. On the other hand, expulsion
may not be wholly unwelcome from the student's point of view. To the
extent that truancy has occasioned this step and the child is over sixteen, expulsion simply allows the child to continue his previous behavior
without any sense of conflicting obligation to or threat from the school.
Other factors might also account for the infrequency of challenges to expulsion. It may be that expulsion is ordinarily sought when the evidence
of misconduct is clear. This is usually true with truancy and may be in
other situations as well. Where the misconduct is indisputable, challenge
either to the charges or the sanction will often seem futile, a perception
confirmed by the high rate of expulsion (790/0) where hearings are held.
In addition, some students and parents may view expulsion as the action
of public authority against which they are relatively powerless. Ironically,
it is at least plausible that the very formality of the proceeding, which
is detailed in the notice letter sent upon initiation of the process, engenders
anxiety and a sense of futility among unsophisticated parents and children,
leading them to avoid an apparently formal and difficult process with
which they do not feel competent to deal.
In addition to the infrequency of challenges to expulsion decisions,
schools may have reduced the demand for procedures by using alternative
strategies for students with severe truancy problems. To the extent
schools encourage or allow students over sixteen to withdraw, or place
them in alternative schools, the necessity for expulsion procedures is
diminished. Withdrawal ordinarily involves no process and the same seemed to be true in the sample schools for educational transfers. We do not
have data on the number of withdrawals or transfers in the sample schools
nor, of course, on the number of withdrawals or transfers occasioned by
student misconduct. However, we do know that truancy cases fall heavily
in the withdrawal category and that, in schools with high expulsion rates,
truancy is the most common reason for that sanction. It seems a fair inference that significant numbers of pupils are removed from school, permanently or indefinitely, without resort to formal procedure.
The use of these alternatives to expulsion may suggest that, whatever
I See Kirp, supra note 38, at 861. It may, however, be that while notice is sent, the
student and his parents cannot read or understand what they receive. The family may
be functionally illiterate or the advice so phrased as to make comprehension difficult for
people unused to formal communications.
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the level of formal compliance with the state Code, some Indiana schools
are "avoiding" or "evading" its substance. As with the widespread use
of "in-school" rather than out-of-school suspensions, whether these
strategies amount to avoidance or evasion of state law requirements will
be taken up later in this discussion.5
C. In-School Suspension
Suspension and expulsion from school are the "traditional" methods
of formal student discipline. However, a variety of alternatives have also
found a place in public schools, many of which first appeared or gained
popularity since the Goss decision. The common element of these alternative programs lies in suspending the misbehaving pupil from regular
classes and privileges, but not from the school itself. Beyond this general
characteristic, however, alternative discipline strategies include a variety
of programs bearing a variety of labels. Some schools employ a "cooling
off' or "time out" room, to which students are referred for short periods
of time in order to "unwind. 57 Others may rely on a "suspension room"
or supervised study hall in which pupils are expected to complete regular
and perhaps supplementary class assignments. "In-school suspension" may
also include considerably more sophisticated programs than those just
described. Some schools employ alternative classrooms in which ability,
achievement, and preference testing is done and a special teacher administers assignments, designed by him- or herself or by the regular
classroom teacher. Special tasks, such as study related to "values clarification," may be included. And a few schools have adopted behavior
modification, group counseling, and other psychodynamic techniques for
disruptive students who are removed from class."5
It seems certain that even within these categories of in-school suspension, significant differences in the nature of the sanction exist. The label
"behavior modification" has no single meaning within the school setting;
it may be applied to a sophisticated system based on a token economy,'

See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
See generally, Comment, Due Process in the PublicSchools-An Analysis of the Procedural Requirements and a Proposalfor Implementing Them, 54 N.C.L. REV. 641 (1976);
McClung, Alternatives to DisciplinaryExclusion in School, 20 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 58 (1975).
" McClung, supranote 56, at 63; McClung, School Classification:Some Legal Approaches
to Labels, 14 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 17, 22 (1973).
"See Harvey & Moosha, In-School Suspension: Does it Work? 61 NASSP BULL. 14 (Jan.
1977); Zimmerman & Archbold, On-Campus Suspension: What It Is and Why It Works, 63
NASSP BULL. 63 (1979).

Zimmerman & Archbold, supra note 58, at 66.
McClung, supra note 56, at 64-65; Levine, Glavin, Quay, Amesley & Werry, An ExperinentalResource Room for Behavior Problem Children, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 131
(1971).
" McClung, supra note 56, at 64.
'
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to placement in a ten by eight foot plywood booth,62 or to any other enterprise whose general purpose includes reformation of the pupil's conduct
in school. The same variety of meaning obtains for the "time-out" room,
which is sometimes described as an area providing a "non-punitive atmosphere, with perhaps a comfortable couch, and books and magazines
around the room"' but may also refer simply to an isolation room in which
the student is confined for some period of time. 4
1. Incidence
Ten of the fifteen sample schools in Indiana employed some form of
in-school suspension. As is true nationally, various labels are applied to
these programs. One calls its version a "learning center," another a
"behavior clinic," a third school sends pupils to a "secluded room," and
a fourth calls its program an "alternative high school." The remainder
are content with the terms "in-school" or "on-site" suspension. Somewhat
different arrangements for students are also included within the general
category of in-school suspension, although program characteristics are not
as different as their labels might suggest and, moreover, are generally
unrelated to the label attached to the program. The "behavior clinic,"
for example, apparently amounts to confinement in the principal's office,
and the "alternative high school" differs from other kinds of in-school
suspension primarily in the fact that students are sent to a separate
building on the grounds rather than to a separate room within the school
building.
6

An "in-school suspension" program used in Connecticut was described in the follow-

ing way:
Rather than spend the days of suspension in academic limbo, students here
are instead isolated from their classmates by being placed in booths in the
behavior modification lab. There, academic-oriented time is alternated with
recreational periods every 15 minutes in another room.... In the two months
that the project has been underway . . . the counselors report a reduction
in recurring problems.
A student, said [the principal], can be placed in the booth for any infraction
of school rules, from smoking on school grounds to fighting or cutting classes.
Prior to any decision to suspend, a conference is held with the child's parents.
While in the booth, the student usually is given assignments, either by his
teacher or a counselor-psychologist. "The student has an educational day that
is structured," said ... a counselor. "If he needs help with English or math,
we can hook him up with a tutor:'
While the plywood booths are soundproof and only 10 by 8 feet in size, [the
counselor] said their purpose is not "isolation for the sake of isolation. The
kids need a break every 15 minutes because the booths have no stimulation.
It would not be humane to keep anybody in there all day."
Hartford Times, Nov. 21, 1974, reprinted in Mc~lung, supra note 56, at 58-59.
63 Glasser, A New Look at Discipline, 3 LEARNING 6 (1974)
cited in McClung, supra note
56, at 63.
", The "time-out" room in a one non-sample Indiana middle school is a 5 by 6 foot room
which was used (despite not having been installed with lights, a window, or a ventilation
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The most common in-school suspension program consists of placement
in a separate, supervised room for a period of one to five days. The pupil's
regular classroom teachers are responsible for providing assignments, for
which (unlike suspension from school) -the student may receive credit.
Suspended children are generally isolated from the rest of the student
body, entirely or at least during class hours. The principal effect of this
sanction in the sample schools consists in removing children from their
usual classes. Schools did not report use of special testing for suspended
pupils nor did any special curriculum seem to be available.
By whatever name and with whatever real meaning, in-school suspension has become, within a relatively brief period, the most common method
of student discipline in the public high schools we investigated. Despite
the fact that this sanction is not formally employed in one-third of the
sample schools, it accounts for more disciplinary actions than any other
device. The overall rate for in-school suspension was 8.9% of the student
population at all fifteen schools and 13.8% of the student population if
only schools with in-school suspension are counted. This punishment is
particularly common in medium and large schools, where it accounts for
between 45 and 90% of all sanctions.65
The rise of in-school suspension has had two significant effects on the
overall frequency and distribution of disciplinary sanctions. The first concerns the rate of sanctions in various schools. Table 7 indicates the
disciplinary rates for medium and large schools controlling for availability
of in-school suspension. (Small schools are excluded because their formal
discipline rates are uniformly low and closely comparable).

system) for emotionally disturbed students. The area director of special education observed
that this is "a technique typically used with emotionally handicapped students. I think
about anywhere you go, you'll see some kind of time-out system." The principal of this
school described the room's function in the following way: "The time-out room is to be
used, for 3-5 minutes, when a child becomes hyperactive, disruptive, or abusive to other
students. It's only there so they can calm down in isolation. It in no way is to be used
as punishment or a disciplinary measure.' As it happened, the first student placed in the
unfinished room developed a claustrophobic reaction. Leonard, The LearningProcess,Bloomington (Ind.) Herald-Telephone, Sept. 3, 1980.
1 It should be added that these figures understate, if anything, the use of this form
of discipline. We included in our data only schools with formal programs, where in-school
suspension was recognized as a special disciplinary alternative. We thus did not include
a medium-sized urban school where the principal stated that the school did not have an
in-school suspension program but also observed that teachers were allowed to exclude
students from class "for a couple of three days." No records were kept of such actions
in this school and their frequency is accordingly unknown. In addition, two schools with
formal in-school suspension did not keep records concerning this sanction, although the
principal reported that it was used "from time to time." If we could include these informal
or unrecorded, but relatively lengthy, removals from class, the incidence of in-school suspension would rise appreciably.
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TABLE 7
Numbers and Rates of Suspension Per
Population for Urban and Rural Schools
With and Without In-School Suspension

With or Without ISS
With ISS
Without ISS

Urban
No.
%
1826 26.7
722 13.9

Rural
No.
%
661 17.9
362
9.5

Mean Rate
22.3
11.7

Schools with a formal in-school suspension program have significantly
higher rates of disciplinary action than those which rely on suspension
and expulsion alone. This effect is found in both urban and rural schools
in about the same degree: the formal disciplinary rate is almost twice
as high for both settings when in-school suspension is available. The same
holds true when size of schools is controlled; no significant differences
generally were found between medium and large schools with respect
to rates of disciplinary actions. Thus, availability of in-school suspension
seems to produce effects independent of size or setting of school.
Adoption of in-school suspension seems to have an effect on the distribution as well as the frequency of sanctions. As Table 1 revealed, the frequency of suspension from school declines sharply where in-school suspension is used. The average out-of-school suspension rate for the seven
medium- and large-sized schools with both alternatives is 4.4% of the student population, whereas the rate of suspensions from school for the five
schools without an in-school alternative is more than twice as high (9.5%).
These figures indicate that the use of in-school suspension increases the
frequency of formal sanctions, but decreases the relative gravity of
disciplinary actions by drawing off some cases that might have resulted
in temporary exclusion from school.
These results are not entirely surprising. Various costs are associated
with the use of relatively severe school penalties. Due process is required
for both suspensions and expulsions and, even though the requirements
for the former are rudimentary, they still may deter its use. Moreover,
the Indiana state school funding law, like that of a number of other states,
depends on "average daily school attendance," and children suspended
or expelled from school are not counted for this purpose." When
disciplinary alternatives are available that do not imply either procedural
" IND. CODE S 21-2-12-7 (1975) (this provision provides that a school's "entitlements" for
tax purposes are determined in part by multiplying the "average daily attendance" of that
school for the previous year by a fixed sum).
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requirements or financial cost, they may be invoked more frequently and
may be substituted for more costly forms of discipline.
2.

Procedures

In-school suspension is usually administered with the informality
associated with temporary exclusions from school prior to Goss v. Lopez.
Parents are notified of the suspension from classes and, in some schools,
are required to sign a notice allowing the student to participate in the
suspension program.
It was reported in at least one school that refusal of parental permission would lead to commencement of expulsion proceedings. In other
schools, however, telephone notification may be all that is undertaken
and, in several, suspension from classes is considered so informal that
its imposition. is not entered on the student's permanent record. Whether,
parental notice is formal or not, however, it seems that no hearing or
other process (even of a rudimentary kind) is employed prior to or in connection with the decision to suspend a child from classes.
The lack of procedure associated with in-school suspension is considered
one of its attractions both by local administrators and in the educational
literature. 7 Whether current practices will ultimately be found satisfactory is a matter that will be discussed shortly. 8 Certainly, however, these
practices are not expressly regulated either by Supreme Court decisions
or by the state Code, and it can be argued that even the rudimentary
procedures of Goss v. Lopez will be held unnecessary when courts
ultimately address in-school suspensions.
III.

COMPLIANCE, IMPACT, AND THE EFFECT OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The previous section explored the behavior of school officials in connection with three kinds of disciplinary sanctions. For one of them, short
suspension, both Supreme Court decision 9 and state law,"0 require procedures for notice and hearing. We found general but not universal consistency in practice with these procedural requirements. This level of
consistency seemed to be attributable more to state law than judicial
policy. It also appeared that a number of schools regularly use in-school
suspension, an unregulated disciplinary sanction, where suspension might

" See, e.g., Meares & Kittle, In-House Suspension, 60 NASSP BULL. 60, 62-63 (1976).
Several of our respondents said that in-school suspension was adopted because hearings
were not required.
" See infra text accompanying notes 94-105.
"' Goss, 419 U.S. 565.
7o IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5-6 (1982).
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have occurred previously. The popularity of in-school suspension is based,
in part, on the assumption that removal from classes can be imposed
without a hearing or any other process. These circumstances suggest,
but do not demonstrate, the existence of some form of avoidance or evasion of judicial and legislative mandates by resort to a sanction that can
be administered informally. A similar strategy was observed in connection with expulsions. The level of reported formal compliance was
remarkably high, but the use in some schools of alternative strategies
(such as encouraged withdrawal from school) presents issues of substantive compliance.
This section examines certain methodological and theoretical issues concerning the relationship of observed behavior and legal rules that are
raised by our findings. It appears that very few of the findings reported
in Part II can be evaluated in terms of traditional legal effectiveness
theory and, conversely, that these notions can explain little of what was
observed. The discussion below explores the difficulty of evaluating school
disciplinary behavior under traditional notions of legal effectiveness, compliance, avoidance and evasion, and the reasons for this difficulty.
For some time, social and political scientific discussion of judicial action
has focused primarily on locating gaps between legal norms and official
or community behavior. Donald Black has summarized this kind of inquiry
in the following way:
With one phrase, legal effectiveness, we capture the major thematic
concern of contemporary sociology of law. The wide range of work
that revolves around the legal effectiveness theme displays a common strategy of problem formulation, mainly a comparison a legal reality to legal ideal of some kind. Typically a gap is shown between lawin-action and law-in-theory. Often the sociologist then goes on to
suggest how the reality might be brought close to the ideal. Law is
regarded as ineffective and in need of reform owing to the disparity
between the legal reality and the ideal. 1
Legal effectiveness research most commonly focuses on "compliance" with
legal commands, meaning the extent to which officials and laymen obey
rules known and directed to them. Attention may also be directed to
"avoidance" or "evasion" of legal rules. If an agency affected by some
recent rule of law modifies its behavior so as to make the law inapplicable
in terms to its practice, that change is said to "avoid" the legal command
if it is successful in escaping the scope of the command and to "evade"
the law if it is not.7 2 Plainly, classification as avoidance or evasion will

Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086,1087 (1972). See also Feeley,
The Concept of Law in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 13, 14 (C.
Reasons & C. Rich eds. 1978).
1 See, e.g., Blaustein & Ferguson, Avoidance, Evasion and Delay, in THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 100 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed. 1973).
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depend on legal action subsequent to both utterance of the initial rule
and the agency's reaction to it.
These aspects of the legal effectiveness approach are subject, however,
to certain limiting assumptions. They suppose, initially, that a relatively
clear norm exists against which the behavior of those subject to the norm
can be measured. This requires that the court or legislature have undertaken to establish a precise norm. Secondly, legal effectiveness research
assumes that one can accurately identify the reason for conduct that is
consistent or inconsistent with legal norms. To say that certain conduct
does or does not comply even with a clear norm, the following
circumstances must be true:
1. The norm must be known to those whose behavior it governs and
must be understood by them accurately. Behavior that adventitiously
comports with what is ordered does not reflect compliance with that
order; similarly, non-conforming conduct does not amount to noncompliance unless the actor is aware of the inconsistent rule.
2. If the norm imposes a requirement that may be waived by the
beneficiary of the rule, it must be known to those for whose protection the norm was established. If the rule is not mandatory in all
instances, and no one invokes it, judgments about non-compliance
cannot be drawn.
3. By the same token, those benefitted by some rule must choose
to assert that rule, where it is known, before it can be said that
failure to provide that benefit constitutes noncompliance.
4. The behavior of the officials in providing a benefit (following a
rule) must be produced either as a matter of course (that is, because
the rule always requires that behavior) or because of demands by
rights holders.
Finally, to the extent that comparison of norms and conduct constitutes
the sole or primary issue under investigation, the legal effectiveness
approach supposes that legal rules are important solely or primarily for
13
what they expressly command of social actors.
These assumptions have been challenged in recent years, primarily on
two grounds. One is that such an inquiry entails methodological problems
which can rarely be overcome and therefore limit the utility of this inquiry
for explaining the function of legal rules. The second concerns the
theoretical assumption upon which such research seems to be based: that
judicial decisions are important because of what they expressly command
of officials or members of the community. This assumption has been questioned by those who hold that promulgation of legal rules has other functions that are at least as important as the direct orders they convey and
should be understood as part of the nature of judicial or legal action itself.
/

13I am indebted to Professor Richard Lempert of The University of Michigan Law School
for suggestions regarding the formulation of these assumptions.
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A. Methodological Problems
1. The Problem of Clarity of Legal Norms
Legal effectiveness research is concerned with the fit between legal
norms and behavior. For such research to be done, relevant legal norms
must be identified and their content specified with considerable accuracy.
Unfortunately, legal rules cannot always be defined precisely, and this
is very often the case with judicially established rules.74 A judicial rule
may be unclear because what it requires of people is expressed
ambiguously or because the activities governed by the rule are not
precisely defined. When requirements are ambiguous, it is impossible to
say with confidence that certain behavior does or does not "comply" with
the legal rule in question, or that responsive conduct amounts to evasion
or avoidance. When the scope of-requirements is unclear, one cannot assert
that observed behavior should have been consistent with a particular legal
rule.
It is important for both the methodological and theoretical issues
discussed in this section to recognize that ambiguity about the content
and extension of legal rules is not merely occasional and accidental but
frequent and institutional. Supreme Court decisions, to take the
immediately relevant instance, do not purport to describe comprehensively
what persons may and may not do across a broad range of activities. They
speak rather to a small set of activities, or often a single kind of act,
carried out under specifically defined conditions. As a matter of legal doctrine, the Court's decision, its "holding," is limited to the facts and issues
presented in the case before them. There are, of course, many things that
a court may say beyond its holding, either by way of rationale or dictum.
These statements frequently illuminate the meaning of a decision but do
not expand the rule of the case. The limits implied by the "holding" of
a case are justified by the realization that courts usually lack full exposition of all relevant considerations concerning issues or facts that are not
directly involved in the case before them. Without full consideration, a
court is less likely to reach an accurate judgment about factual and legal
questions and, therefore, does not and ought not attempt to decide
hypothetical or moot issues. Accordingly, judicial rule-making is not a
The ambiguity of legal norms has not always been recognized. Malcolm Feeley has
observed of legal effectiveness research that
[Tlhe specification of [legal] goals-the law-in-theory-is rarely regarded as
problematic by the researchers who follow this approach. Typically legal goals
tend to be viewed as self-evident or easily identified and are posited without
much ado.... Thus the basis of comparison-the standard against which reality
is measured-is rarely clearly identified and operationalized.
Feeley, The Concept of Law in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw: A CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE 13, 15 (C. Reasons & R. Rich eds. 1978).
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process designed for creating a body of law comprehensively governing
75
human activity.
Even within the class of actually decided cases, moreover, uncertainty
regarding the meaning of rules is common. As a political matter, it is
significant that the Supreme Court is a collegial group whose holdings
frequently seek to accommodate different views of the values and rules
announced. 7 Clarity regarding the precise implications of an opinion is
likely to be sacrificed in the interest of securing a majority in the case.
Clarity may also be compromised by the need to justify a current decision
in light of prior authority, whose present application depends on
arguments by analogy or unarticulated premises inferred from earlier decisions. While such arguments are legitimate and often indispensable, they
also may produce doubt about the basis or scope of the holding of the
case in which they are employed.
The uncertainties resulting from doctrinal and political limitations are
peculiarly great when courts enter areas they have not previously addressed. The limited decisions that emerge typically create more questions about what will be required than they answer.
Piecemeal decisions unsettle old patterns without providing unambiguous new patterns to which expectations can conform. Time and
time again, public and private decisionmakers have both underread
and underreacted and overread and overreacted to the implications
of a new trend of Supreme Court decisions-only to find later that
77
their adaptations have been, respectively, insufficient or excessive.
Our study of school disciplinary practices after Goss v. Lopez illustrates
both the uncertainty that frequently attends early judicial forays into
an area of activity and the extent to which the need for a clear legal
rule limits legal effectiveness research. Take, first, the easiest situation:
the relationship between procedural rules for short suspensions and
reported practices. Goss does provide clear rules to a point, and we were
able to compare local school behavior with legal requirements on the
following issues: Is notice of charges given, is a summary of evidence
provided, and do students have an opportunity to respond to the charges
against them? Even within the clearest area of decision, however, there
are matters about which compliance could not be evaluated. Suppose, for
example, that a school informs a student prior to suspension that he is
charged with theft from another (unnamed) student. It is impossible to
say whether this practice complies with the Goss requirement of notice
of charges because the Supreme Court declared only that notice is required
and did not define the content required of the notice. Or suppose that
Is See

D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-67 (1977).
Levine & Becker, Toward and Beyond a Theory of Supreme Court Impact, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 230, 231-32 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed. 1973).
7 HOROWITZ, supra note 75, at 35.
7a
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the student, who denies the theft, is then told that a teacher saw his
misconduct. The teacher is not identified and the evidence of theft is not
further specified. This conduct may constitute an adequate summary of
the evidence or it may not; because the Court did not indicate what such
a summary must include, however, nothing can fairly be said about
compliance. 8
The necessity for clear legal rules describing conduct thus constrains
sharply what can be said about legal effectiveness even where conduct
is expressly addressed by the Court.7 1 Such constraint is even more
apparent when the applicability of rules is questionable. It often happens
that a court announces a rule for situations where certain conditions
obtain. However, the case itself only addresses one such situation and
leaves open what other kinds of facts and conditions fall within this class
and thus are subject to the stated rule. This uncertainty of extension
currently obtains with respect to in-school suspensions. The Supreme
Court has announced several rules for suspension procedure, but was only
concerned in the case before it with suspensions from school. Educators
in Indiana and nationally assume, therefore, that the Goss holding does
not apply to in-school suspensions. This assumption contains, however,
two distinct propositions: that Goss does not itself hold that the procedures
it announced apply to in-school suspension and that the Court will not
hold that in-school suspensions so resemble in their consequences out-ofschool suspensions that both must be accompanied by the same procedure.
8 A number of other areas of ambiguity within the Goss rules have been identified by

William Buss, including the following:
[D]oes Goss tell us anything about very short suspensions, say, for one day
or a fraction of a day; resulting when a student is sent home from school because
of misconduct? Is it still arguable that the deprivation involved in such a situation amounts to deprivation of constitutional liberty or property? What about
indefinable suspensions, as where a student is kept out of school until he agrees
to have his hair cut in a certain way or to discontinue wearing an armband?
Should such suspensions be regarded as even shorter than the Goss suspension standard because the student has control of his or her destiny: i.e., by
complying with the school's directive, the suspension ends? Or should the
serious effects of extended suspension be considered whatever the cause?
Buss, ImplicationsofGoss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland for ProfessionalDiscretionand
Liability in Schools, 4 J.L. & EDuc. 567, 571 (1975).
Ambiguity also exists in connection with the Court's observation that the rules it announced in Goss apply only to the "usual" short suspension situation. The question of what
this class includes is left unspecified, moving one critic of the decision to ask: "After all,
what 'situation' isn't 'unusual' in the mind's eye of a resourceful plaintiffs attorney....
Claims will certainly abound that the student suspended just before graduation, or just
before examination time, or even before the 'big game' is entitled to protection beyond
those provided in the usual situation." Kola, Hard Choices in School Discipline and The
Hardening of the Due Process Mold, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 583, 585 (1975).
11 Of course, some judicial rules are sufficiently clear to allow measurements of compliance. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) provides one instance in its rules on confessions, although questions may arise as to whether Miranda extends to various investigative situations. See, e.g., Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, CustodialPolice Interrogation
in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda,66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
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Surely school officials are correct as to the first of these points, but the
second is disputable. As we will have occasion to see, a good case can
indeed be made that in-school suspensions are sufficiently different from
suspensions from school that they should not be treated identically for
procedural purposes. However, a plausible argument can also be advanced
that Goss should and will apply to some or all in-school suspensions. 0
Because the ambit of Goss is unclear, one cannot say whether its rules
apply to in-school suspensions and judgments about compliance should
not be made.
A similar problem in defining the extension of judicial decisions arises
in connection with the use of withdrawals or transfers to an alternative
school in lieu of expulsion. Goss indicated that at least its rudimentary
procedures, and probably something more, would be required for "longer
suspensions and expulsions" from school. It is certainly arguable that
withdrawals procured under threat of expulsion and disciplinary transfers
to a radically different educational program will be held to fall within
the class of longer suspensions or expulsions. At least one pre-Goss federal
circuit court case concluded that transfer of a student to a "Continuation
School" was "tantamount to expulsion" and that the transferring school
was required to give the pupil "some opportunity to present a mitigative
argument."'" It is also arguable, however, that to permit withdrawal by
a student with an extensive history of truancy or other misconduct is
a generous act on the school's part, saving the former from the stigma
of expulsion if he or she so elects but also preserving the right to a hearing
if the student wishes continued enrollment. Transfers to alternative institutions can also be distinguished from expulsions, because they do not
involve a total deprivation of public education nor carry the degree of
stigma associated with permanent removal from the educational system."
If it should be held that withdrawals and/or transfers amount to denial
of public education in the same degree as expulsion, they presumably
will fall within the class described as "expulsion" by Goss and thus be
subject to whatever procedures are ultimately required for such sanc-

" See infra text accompanying notes 97-98 & 103-05.
" Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972). See Comment, ProceduralDue
Process in Public Schools: The 'Thrust' of Goss v. Lopez, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 934, 965-66.
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss, declared that the protected interests involved
in involuntary transfers are "identical in principle" with those discussed by the majority
in connection with short suspensions. 419 U.S. at 584, 597. This suggests, of course, that
transfers might be treated as suspensions rather than expulsions, which is not necessarily
inconsistent with the Betts decision. Although Betts analogizes transfers to expulsions, the
procedures addressed are similar to those later required by Goss for the less drastic remedy.
See also, Quintinella v. Carey, No. 75-C-829 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1975) (action transferring
petitioner to a high school equivalency class meeting at night is the "functional equivalent
of an absolute suspension" because student could not receive a "standard high school
diploma").
I See Comment, supra note 81, at 965-66.
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tions. Their inclusion within this class remains to be decided, however,
and it is impossible until that time to say whether use of either strategy
amounts to avoidance or evasion of the Supreme Court's command.
It is also worth mentioning that the expulsion issue reflects yet a third
kind of uncertainty commonly associated with legal norms. Part of the
requisite procedures for expulsion can be inferred: at a minimum, the
Goss rights must be accorded students facing this penalty. It appears,
however, that something further must also be done procedurally before
a student is expelled from school, and these further requirements have
not been articulated. The remarkably formal procedure adopted by the
Indiana legislature would almost surely satisfy any requirements the
Supreme Court is likely to impose, but that is hardly a measure of accurate compliance with the Court's rules. The Supreme Court might well
hold some of those requirements unnecessary as a constitutional matter
because they too heavily burden school disciplinary decisions.'
2.

The Problem of Causation

The need for precise rules to measure legal effectiveness thus
significantly limits the available areas of inquiry. Judicial rules are sufficiently clear to allow judgments about compliance only with respect to
some aspects of short suspension procedure. Where the condition of
adequate clarity is met, however, methodological problems in establishing
compliance remain. We have already seen, in discussing short suspensions, that even where the Supreme Court adopted clear procedural rules
which most Indiana high schools follow, one cannot necessarily say that
those schools comply with Goss. "Compliance," as that term is ordinarily
employed by social and political scientists, refers to a direct causal relation between legal command and behavior. Accordingly, three elements
in addition to a clear rule are said to be necessary: (a) knowledge of the
rule; (b) intention to conform one's behavior to the command; and (c) conforming behavior in fact." In addition, it seems (although this is less clearly
stated in the literature) that compliance presumes conforming behavior
because one has been directed by law to act in a certain way., Certainly
the fact of conduct consistent with a Supreme Court mandate is not sufficient to establish compliance with that mandate; there must also be

' Cf. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (the court held that hearing procedures for
parental commitment of children as mentally retarded are not constitutionally required
because the costs involved outweigh any increased accuracy in fact finding. Although the
decision clearly holds that a state may adopt a hearing process, it also expresses doubt
about the desirability of that strategy).
Wasby, The Supreme Court'sImpact: Some Problems of Conceptualizationand Measurement, in COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW 129, 134 (S. Krislov et al. eds, 1972).
' S. WASBY, supra note 3, at 29.
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awareness of the rule and an intention to follow that rule, whether one
likes it or not.'
Presumably, the converse of this definition of compliance also holds
true: noncompliance occurs only if some person or agency knows of a rule
governing behavior and intentionally fails to obey it. One who is unaware
of the legal rule or believes (wrongly) that he is following the rule is not
guilty of noncompliance." It would be true that a Supreme Court decision or other rule is not given effect, but that should be attributed to
a failure of communication or understanding rather than to a failure of
compliance.
Given these restrictions, our data--even if accepted as an entirely
accurate reflection of-local school practices -permit few conclusions concerning compliance. We cannot say that the 71% of schools that act in
a manner consistent with Goss' requirements for short suspensions are
complying with that decision, nor that the schools which do not act in
an entirely consistent fashion are engaging in noncompliance. Compliance
requires accurate knowledge of the legal norm, combined with action
intended to accomplish that norm. Our interview data indicated that
knowledge of the Goss decision by principals was considerably lower than
the rate of inconsistent behavior. While only 41% of the principals and
deans had accurate information concerning judicial policy, almost 71%
followed the rules embodied in that policy.' Plainly, these procedural rules
were adopted for some reason other than the Court's command and thus
do not indicate compliance with that command.
The most likely alternative basis is state law, which imposes the same
process elements as Goss. It does seem that all but one of the principals
and deans (94%) could state accurately the state law requirements for
suspension. It is tempting, therefore, to view the reported practices as
an instance of compliance with state legislative rules, rather, than judicially
created commands. Compliance requires, however, not only accurate
knowledge of norms, which is present, but a direct causal relation. We
do not know what practices were followed by local schools prior to
modification of the state code and, without that information, causal
statements cannot be made. Some school officials might have adopted the
same process without external commands, but because they think those
procedures are appropriate as a matter of educational administration. 9
Indeed, the Supreme Court supposed this would often be the case. The
majority opinion observed that the procedures it imposed are, if anything,
" See, e.g., Washy, supra note 84; Barth, Perception and Acceptance of Supreme Court
Decisions at the State and Local Level, 17 J. PUB. L. 308, 315 (1968).
7 This assumption of compliance research contrasts sharply, of course, with the legal
rule for liability. It is familiar knowledge that ignorance of the law is no excuse, whereas
ignorance seemingly avoids an imputation of noncompliance.
M See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
See S. WASBY, supra note 3, at 29.
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"less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in
order to avoid unfair suspensions."' Nor was this suggestion mere wishful
thinking or post hoc rationalization on the Court's part. As it happens,
the school actually involved in Goss had previously adopted an informal
procedure "remarkably similar" to that required by the Court but had
not, unfortunately, followed its existing procedure in the litigated
instance.9 1
The difficulty that attends conclusions about compliance with requirements for short suspensions exists for noncompliance as well. In
almost every case, principals in the schools which failed to follow the Goss
procedures lacked accurate knowledge of what Goss demanded of them.
Accordingly, their conduct, while inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
mandate, is not the intentional disregard of legal rules that is ordinarily
understood as noncompliance. Indeed, confident judgments concerning noncompliance can only be made where local practices are inconsistent with
state law requirements, which were generally known by our respondents.
Even here, however, the inference is only probable. Other explanations,
such as an incorrect belief by principals that their practices comported
with state law, are also plausible on the evidence available.
3.

The Problems Applied

It appears that a legal effectiveness approach, if used with the strictness necessary for direct causal statements about rules and conduct, rarely
permits evaluative statements about observed behavior. Legal rules are
often unclear in content and extension, and causal problems add to the
difficulty of evaluation. Two strategies are available in dealing with these
obstacles. One is to infer, lacking clear commands, some generalized notion
of legal requirements from existing authority and then compare court
or school behavior with that notion.2 The other is to exclude from consideration the relationship of law to behavior except where the law
announces clear commands.
Neither of these approaches is ultimately satisfactory. A hypothetical
construction of what due process requires in a given situation, for example,
is a highly speculative enterprise. One glance at the prevailing general
calculus for determining what process is due reveals why this is so. A
court must take into account, and weigh against each other, the following
considerations:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
91Id.

' For a debate on this general strategy, compare Black, The Boundariesof Legal Sociology,
81 YALE L. J. 1086 (1972) with Nonet, ForJurisprudentialSociology, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW: A CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE 115 (C. Reasons & C. Rich eds. 1978).
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second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.93

The elusiveness of predicting what process is due can be illustrated
by a careful analysis of in-school suspension practices. We have already
seen that educators generally assume that this penalty may be employed
without resort to any special process. They may be right in this belief.
In holding that a suspended student suffers a constitutionally recognized
deprivation requiring some adequate form of process, Goss v. Lopez relied
heavily on the property interest lost when pupils are excluded, even temporarily, from educational benefits granted by state law. 4 Students under
in-school suspension are not, however, denied all educational opportunities,
even though they are removed from their regular classrooms. Indeed,
proponents of this sanction often consider it of special educational value
for the students upon whom it is imposed. Some programs use in-school
suspension as an occasion for testing students to determine if academic
deficiencies are related to misconduct.9" In-school suspension has also been
described as an arrangement by which "school staff would work with problem students in a separate environment, where individual problemssuch as poor self-concept, the need for intensive individualized instruction, and emotional, social, and environmental difficulties -could receive
more attention."9 Even in less ambitious programs, students remain in
school and are expected to complete the same academic assignments given
their classmates. Accordingly, students are not denied state-created entitlements to education through in-school suspension and, absent such a
deprivation, due process is not required.
A persuasive argument can also be made, however, that some or all
forms of in-school suspension must be accompanied by the process set
forth in Goss v. Lopez. Most broadly, it may be suggested that the necessity
for due process in Goss was predicated on an infringement of a liberty
interest as well as deprivation of a property entitlement. The majority
in Goss observed that suspension may affect adversely a student's "good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity" as well as his right to receive
education.' Damage to reputation may accompany suspension from classes
as well as suspension from school. Classmates will know of the disciplinary
11Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a thorough analysis of the issues
in applying this standard to the school setting, see Buss, Easy CasesMake Bad Law: Academic
Expulsions and the Uncertain Law of ProceduralDue Process, 65 IowA L. REV. 1 (1979).
9'Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
Harvey & Moosha, supra note 58, at 15.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 735.
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action and others may learn of it if the fact of discipline is entered on
the child's permanent record." Two legal questions are therefore raised.
The first is whether the possibility of an injury to reputation is itself
a sufficient liberty concern to require Goss-type procedures. The second
is whether, if reputational interests will suffice, harm only among students
is sufficient to implicate those interests where in-school suspension goes
unrecorded.
No answer to either question can confidently be given. Although there
is precedent indicating that interests in reputation alone may require due
process protection," few recent decisions have so held and, indeed, the
Court has indicated that stigma by itself is not a major concern. 101 The
argument for procedural protection is weaker yet where reputation is
affected only among classmates. The Court may reach one of two doctrinally different conclusions, both of which yield the same result. It may
be decided that the stigma confined to other students is de minimis and,
consequently, that no constitutionally protected liberty interest has been
invaded by in-school suspension. 10 1 Alternatively, the Court might decide
that, even if a liberty interest in avoiding stigma is invaded by in-school
suspension, that interest is so minor that it is outweighed by the cost
and inconvenience associated with procedural requirements.92° On either
theory, the school will not be obliged to hold even a rudimentary hearing
when it suspends a child from classes but not from school.
Proponents of hearings in connection with in-school suspension may,
however, further claim that some in-school suspension programs do not
in fact provide educational benefits equivalent to the ordinary curriculum
and, therefore, inflict the same harm deemed to require protection in Goss.
The strongest case for this conclusion would arise with practices like
"benching," which apparently requires a pupil "to sit on a bench all day
long doing nothing."'' This discipline denies the student an education
11See Comment, ProceduralDue Process in the Public Schools, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 934,
960-61.
" Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
10 The role of stigma in due process analysis is currently unclear. At least one member
of the Supreme Court appears to have doubts about this concept, which he characterizes
as "a subjective judgment that is standardless." University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
294 n.34 (1978) (opinion of Mr. Justice Powell). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the
Court rejected the contention that harm to reputation was by itself sufficient to constitute
a deprivation of liberty or property. But the Court carefully distinguished cases like Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the stigmatization was accompanied
by deprivation of some other statutory or constitutional right. In the situation under consideration, the child may or may not be held to suffer an independent deprivation of a
statutory right to education, and the result is thus unclear under the rationale of Paul.
10 Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
102 Cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (no procedures required for corporal punishment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (no procedure beyond review by medical professional required for commitment by parents of child as mentally retarded).
1034 J.L. & EDUC. 587, 588 (1975).
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perhaps as fully as if he were excluded from school. Even where some
authentic educational component exists, it can be argued that in-school
suspension necessarily involves a change in educational program, if only
in loss of exposure to other students."' The issue then becomes whether
a change rather than a denial of educational program entails due process
rights. This question is particularly difficult to resolve because it may
involve factual issues concerning both the quality of the program and the
appropriateness of the program for participating students. Moreover,
judicial decisions provide little clear guidance on the role of due process
in program assignments within the public school setting. There are, it
is true, cases holding that at least a non-adversarial opportunity to in-5
quire into pupil placement is necessary for some kinds of assignments,'
but these decisions do not expressly control the present issue. The
relatively few existing cases are all lower court decisions, frequently based
on consent decrees, and therefore not controlling in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, these decisions deal primarily with placement for educational
rather than disciplinary reasons. The procedures thought appropriate for
this purpose typically involve an informal, conversational sharing of ideas
rather than the conflict resolution opportunities usually contemplated by
due process in a disciplinary setting.
It is, fortunately, unnecessary for present purposes to resolve these
interesting but tangled questions. Certainly one cannot say with confidence
whether in-school suspension requires some form of hearing or what that
form would be. Moreover, good faith arguments can be made in either
direction. Any effort to hypothesize due process requirements in connection with in-school suspension must therefore be inaccurate as a descriptive
matter and unfair to the extent that normative judgments about noncompliance or evasion are offered.
Would it, perhaps, be fairer to give school officials the benefit of the
legal doubt and consider the use of informally-processed in-school
suspensions in place of suspensions from school, or withdrawals in place
of expulsions, as instances of "avoidance" rather than "evasion?" The
answer is plainly "Yes," but increased fairness is purchased at the cost
of evaluative capacity under a command theory. While "avoidance" carries
with it an unpleasant connotation, in this context the term necessarily
assumes that the conduct is lawful. For example, the paradignatic tax
avoider finds a favorable provision in the Internal Revenue Code and,
by investing in oil drilling partnerships which yield large deductions, pays
less taxes than seems just. However, any negative judgment implied by
the term "avoidance" here must be derived from some source outside
1o4Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (emphasizing importance of

contact with students in public education).

I's E.g., Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 886 (D.D.C. 1972).
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of law, because the law actively encourages the taxpayer's investment
by granting it preferential treatment. Certainly it would be inconsistent
to say that our taxpayer is acting in a fashion normatively inconsistent
with legal rules when he or she is doing precisely what the law encourages.
Officials in our sample schools may occupy a similar position when they
employ in-school suspensions or encourage withdrawals. It is arguable
that, by burdening suspensions from school, the Supreme Court wished
to encourage other methods of student discipline and it surely did not
mean to prohibit other, less intrusive, forms of student discipline. Given
our initial assumption that in-school suspension is not within the Goss
holding and therefore an instance of avoidance, this lawful change in practice away from regulated activity does not seem normatively condemnable.
The change may have been an anticipated or an unanticipated reaction
to Goss by the public schools, but is not subject to evaluation against
the commands announced by that case.
If the difficulty of predicting legal outcomes often makes it inaccurate
and unfair to speak in terms of compliance or legal effectiveness, the alternative would seem to be exclusion of behavior that is not responsive to
clear commands from the scope of research. To exclude such behavior
ignores two elements, however. The first is that prediction or anticipation of law is an integral part of societal response to legal decisions. The
second is that this form of response is not conducted without regard to
law but in light of it, through the kind of reasoning that the common
law process itself assumes. The following section will argue that an adequate theory of law must consider the significance of judicial decisions
for yet undecided controversies in which they will figure, and research
into the relationship between law and social action must take into account
the same process.
B. The Theoretical Problem
The methodological limitations associated with traditional legal effectiveness research reflect theoretical limitations inherent in viewing law
solely or primarily as a legal command backed by coercive authority.
Although this view has found eminent support,' ° it has also been criticized onA number of grounds, two of which concern us here.
1.

Judicial Decisions That Do Not Command

The first criticism is that a command theory does not adequately account for laws that authorize varieties of behavior rather than require
106See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-32 (1954 ed.); H.
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 30-74 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961).
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specific conduct. 1 7 Rules defining the ways in which valid contracts or
wills may be made offer the usual instances of such laws; they do not
impose duties or obligations but rather empower individuals to create
legal relationships for themselves. Although private law areas provide
the typical cases of permissive rules, rules of similar effect also exist in
the constitutional arena. Take, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Ingrahamv. Wright,"'0 which addressed due process requirements
for corporal punishment in public schools. Ingraham held that, although
pupils have a liberty interest that is affected by paddling, neither notice
of charges nor even a rudimentary hearing is constitutionally required
when that sanction is employed. The Court's decision does not mean that
a school may not provide procedures before paddling a child, but rather
that it is not compelled to do so. Such a decision establishes no coercive
norm but is plainly as much a statement of law as Goss, which does
establish such norms. It should be clear that, where law creates no coercive rule, there can be no question of compliance. If a school does not
provide procedures for corporal punishment, it is because the school
chooses not to, not because it must not. If a school does create some form
of process for this sanction, that is because it wishes to do so, not because
it must. Neither event constitutes obedience to a command.
Such decisions may, of course, have an impact of some kind. Suppose
that a school had established procedures for corporal punishment after
Goss was decided but before Ingraham v. Wright, believing that the
Supreme Court would ultimately hold that a child facing corporal punishment is entitled to the same protection as one about to be suspended.
If those procedures were dismantled after Ingrahammade clear that they
were unnecessary, a causal relationship between Ingrahamand local practice would surely exist. That relationship also has nothing to do with compliance, since the school was equally free to leave in place or to eliminate
its process for corporal punishments.
It might be said that decisions like Ingraham,which are by no means
uncommon, 10 9 neither resemble laws facilitating contracts nor contradict
a view of law as command. Rather, they amount to a declaration that
no constitutional rule governs the behavior in question. For this distinction to be significant, however, one must view law only as a set of affirmative decisions: Thou shalt do this and Thou shalt not do that. From the
perspective of the governed community, decisions that say one may do
certain things if one wants are quite as important as prescriptive or pro' See H.L.A. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-38
OF THE LAW 83-92 (1909).

(1961); J.C. GRAY. THE NATURE

AND SOURCES

...Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

"0 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (states may but need not provide hearings prior to commitment of children as retarded); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (states may but need not provide jury trial for delinquency prosecutions).
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scriptive statements. If we follow the usual view that laws define the
limits of behavior and that otherwise citizens are free to act, declarations concerning the areas of regulation and the areas of freedom serve
an identical function.
2.

Judicial Decisions As Predictors of Commands

The second deficiency of a theory of law as command lies in its failure
to recognize that the effect of commands may extend beyond their terms.
H.L.A. Hart observed that the theory of law as command misses "the
way in which rules [of law] function as rules in the life of those who are
normally the majority of society. These are the officials, lawyers, or private
persons who use them, in one way or another, as guides to the conduct
of social life."11' Most members of the community want to follow legal
rules and many want at least to avoid contact with formal legal processes.
They use law, so far as it is known to them, to guide their conduct in
a way that will keep them distant from legal conflict. This kind of behavior
is expressly relied upon by criminal laws, for which deterrence is a primary
goal,"' but also in virtually every area where laws state norms for behavior
that we expect to be followed. Indeed, if most citizens did not apply the
law to themselves but insisted upon enforcement by society, the legal
system would collapse from over-use. 2
Were all laws clear and comprehensive, this point about self-application
would lose much of its force for present purposes. We have seen, however,
that laws are not always comprehensive and unambigious. What, then,
shall the citizen do who wishes for moral or prudential reasons to abide
by the law?
In some instances, he may avoid kinds of activity for which rules are
unclear. In others, however, life must continue despite the absence of
clear law. Two examples in the Introduction illustrate this point. The
Supreme Court in 1967 decided that juveniles charged with delinquency
are entitled to the rights to notice of charges, representation by counsel,
110 Hart, supra note 107, at 88. The same argument, applied to legal effectiveness theory,
has been made by Feeley, supra note 74, at 27-28 and by Gerstein, The Practiceof Fidelity

to Law, in

COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW

35 (S. Krislov et a]. eds. 1972).

.. Whether called "socialization" or general deterrence, the criminal law is intended to
create inhibitions and shape attitudes in a law-abiding direction. These functions are, if
anything, more important than deterrence itself, because they lead people to obey the law
without regard to an obvious likelihood of detection and sanction. See Andenaes, The Moral

or Educative Influence of CriminalLaw, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 50, 51 (J.L. Tapp & F.J. Levine eds. 1977).

IN SOCIETY:

"' This proposition is, perhaps, clearest in connection with plea-bargaining without which,
it has been said, the criminal justice system would be unable effectively to function. Steinberg
& Paulsen, A Conversationwith Defense Counsel on Problems of a CriminalDefense, 7 PRAC.
LAW. 25, 31 (1961). However, it is also obvious that only a minute fraction of possible civil
disputes reach courts and, even so, congestion and long delays are common in many jurisdictions. See generally, Church, Civil Case Delay in State TrialCourts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 166 (1978).
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cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination."' At the
same time, it limited its holding to those rights, expressly reserving judgment on issues such as the appropriate burden of proof, right to bail,
and right to an appeal. Juvenile courts, however, could not avoid dealing
with these issues; they had to decide what burden of proof applied in
order to decide any case before them and whether bail was necessary
in order to deal with any detained child.
Similarly, school boards and principals after Goss could not practically
limit disciplinary action to short suspension from school, although it was
the only sanction for which clear guidance existed. For some students,
such as chronic truants, that penalty is futile. For others, including violent
or otherwise dangerous pupils, it is simply insufficient. And, in the other
direction, suspension from school is a relatively severe measure which
may be inappropriate and damaging for children who engage only in minor
and occasional misconduct.
In both instances, administrators (whether trial judges or educators)
were required to maintain programs knowing that the law would at some
stage review their activities but without knowing what it would say about
them. In deciding how to conduct their business in these unsettled areas,
judges and school administrators often wished to do what was right. They
may have wished this because they respected the law, because they did
not want their actions upset by subsequent litigative challenge, or because
(in the school discipline situation) they feared civil liability in the event
their practices turned out to be legally improper."' Whatever the reason,
these officials had to predict or anticipate what the law would be and,
in making that prediction, relied on the early and piecemeal decisions
that had been rendered. Those decisions, however fragmentary their
coverage, identify the rights and interests and announce the themes that
will be most directly relevant to later decisions in the area.
Anticipation of subsequent decisions and reliance upon prior authority
in doing so, it should be emphasized, are not merely practical adaptations
to life but integral parts of legal development. From a legal positivist
perspective, the study of law itself involves "nothing but the prediction
that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in
,,'This prediction
this way or that way by judgment of the court.

1

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
O
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW 457,458 (1897). From a social science perspective, the phenomenon of prediction is an attribute of political authority. Malcolm Feeley
summarizes this theory in the following way:
Following Weber, Friedrich has argued that to a large extent "authority,"
i.e. legitimate power, is the ability to have people anticipate interests and
1

act accordingly without having to rely on explicit communications and the
concomitant threat of sanctions. Clearly, the Supreme Court is an institution
enjoying a particularly high position of legitimacy within American society.
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is properly made, moreover, on the basis of what authority there is that
is most directly in point. For example, although Goss does not hold that
any particular process is required for sanctions other than short suspensions, it does hold that children possess certain liberty interests in attending school, that certain acts deprive them of those interests, and that
under some circumstances deprivation cannot occur without process of
some description. These legal categories will also operate for subsequent
decisions and, moreover, decisions will be made by analogizing to the circumstances actually considered in Goss. Any earlier decision is precedential, even if it does not declare a result for later cases in the area.
A clear illustration of the relationship between cases that do not decide
particular propositions and anticipation of later decisions arises in the
juvenile court area. We have seen that In re Gault, while holding certain
rights previously associated with criminal prosecutions applicable to delinquency proceedings, did not pass on the appropriate burden of proof in
these matters. Courts, nevertheless, had to decide whether they should
retain the traditional "preponderance of the evidence" standard or adopt
the more stringent requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the latter burden would be required, relying on Gault's emphasis on the severity of the consequences
attendant upon an adjudication of delinquency.' "It would seem," the
Illinois court concluded,
that the reasons which caused the Supreme Cburt to import the constitutional requirements of an adversary criminal trial into delinquency
hearings logically require that a finding of delinquency for misconduct ... is valid only when the acts of delinquency are proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.... We need not be reminded that the Gault decision did not pass upon the precise question of the quantum of proof that
must be shown to validate afinding of delinquency. We believe, however,
that the language of that opinion exhibits a spirit that transcends
specific issues there involved, and that, in view thereof, it would not
be consistent with due process or equal protection to grant allegedly
delinquent juveniles the same procedural rights that protect adults
charged with crimes, while depriving these rights of their full efficacy
by allowing a finding upon a lesser standard of proof than that required to sustain a criminal conviction.'

For this reason, therefore, we could expect that anticipated reactions would
account for some substantial portion of the total impact of the Supreme Court.
Feeley, Power, Impact, and the Supreme Court, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
218, 225 (T. Becker & M. Feeley eds. 2d ed. 1973). The "law of anticipated reactions" described
by Feeley seemingly presumes the existence of particular behavior desired by the Court.
The anticipation described in the text does not, however, suppose that the Court has yet
decided what it wishes in areas not yet resolved by existing authority; nevertheless, prediction and anticipation are necessary substitutes for knowledge of what the law requires.
"I In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
.1.
Id. at 540, 232 N.E.2d at 719 (emphasis supplied).
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The Supreme Court of California, however, reached the opposite conclusion, again based on its reading of the Gault decision.
It is inconceivable to us ... that our highest Court attempted, through
Gault, to undermine the basic philosophy, idealism and purposes of
the juvenile court. We believe that the Supreme Court did not lose
sight of the humane and beneficial elements of the juvenile court
system ... it did not intend to convert the juvenile court into a criminal
court for young people. Rather, we find that the Supreme Court
recognized that juvenile courts, while acting within the constitutional
guarantees of due process, must, nonetheless, retain their flexible procedures and techniques."
Once the assumption was made that Gault did not generally affect traditional juvenile court values, it was easy to conclude that while the adjudicative hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment," proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not one of these
essentials.
What is important here is that both the California and Illinois courts
tried to anticipate what would be required of juvenile courts by looking
to a Supreme Court decision that expressly declared that it was not
addressing the question of burden of proof. It is also important that,
although the Illinois prediction was ultimately confirmed,' both decisions
are reasonable in their treatment of an unclear but undeniably crucial
precedent.
Although we do not have as clear an example of anticipation based
on early decisions in the school discipline setting as for juvenile court
procedure, its existence cannot reasonably be doubted. Indeed, this process
has informed discussions and practices for all of the kinds of sanctions
we have examined. Arguments surrounding procedural requirements for
in-school suspension, reviewed above, commonly rely on some interpretation of Goss v. Lopez, although the Goss holding is limited to suspensions
from school. The current view of educators, expressed in journals 2 ' and
during our interviews, is not simply that no law exists in this area but
that current law (that is, Goss) requires a due process hearing only where
the sanction imposed has certain consequences. Because the Goss opinion
relied heavily on denial of educational benefits to justify its result and
in-school suspension provides those benefits, the latter form of discipline
is arguably exempt as a constitutional matter from hearing requirements.
Those who contend for the opposite conclusion will likewise base their
predictions on the Supreme Court's expressed rationale in Goss, as will

118 In re M., 459 P.2d 296, 302, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1969), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson,
211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9, 15-17 (1968).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
1

See supra note 67.
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lower federal courts, state courts, and the Supreme Court itself when
they deal with this issue.
Another manifestation of the penumbra created by early or piecemeal
decisions is evident in the Indiana Due Process and Pupil Discipline Code
provisions on expulsions, even though the Code initially reflected trends
in lower court rather than Supreme Court decisions.' It is impossible
to believe that procedures such as the right to remain silent, not to be
punished for one's silence, to a formal record and to severance of cases
were incorporated because they reflected anyone's idea of desirable
administrative practice. They doubtless appear because they seemed to
legislators and their legal advisors to meet whatever process courts might
demand for expulsion matters."= This judgment was in turn reached on
the basis of previous court decisions setting forth elements of due process
in school disciplinary and other settings. The fact that the Code's provisions are probably more formal than what is necessary does not matter
for present purposes; they surely represent a preference for adopting
a scheme that, in view of existing law, seems sure to satisfy future requirements rather than one that may be closer to what will be commanded
but also may be found deficient in some respect.
Goss, like Gault and other early decisions, is thus as important for what
it presages as for what it says. It is probably true, as many have said,
that Goss itself is a minimal step which will have little significant impact
on schools. However, its rationale is of considerable importance. It has
12 See Note, Recent Developments, 6 IND. L. REV. 300, 330-31 (1972), suggesting that the
Indiana Code was adopted in recognition of "The growing body of federal case law on student due process and [in anticipation of]its trend .. "
Wasby has described the same process in a different setting:
It may be that, technically, "Neither the enterprise nor the government
is necessarily bound by decisions to which they are not a party .... They
continue on their practices until a specific judicial decree is aimed at them."
...Maybe-but one can be fairly sure that corporation counsel and government attorneys as well are exanining court decisions carefully to see what
they can learn as a basis for their future behavior, whether that behavior
be directed at complying with the Court's rulings or in some way circumventing them. We certainly find cases where lawyers have taken the doctrines
used in one case and extended it to other areas. ...This has led to the statement that 'the test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside
the four corners of the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds of thousands of lawyers and government officials who have to deal at
first hand with the problems of everyday life and of the thousands of judges
who have to handle the great mass of the litigation which ultimately develops.'
The importance of doctrine for the study of impact is shown by statements
such as the foregoing and Shapiro's remark that "the overall impact of the
Supreme Court and other political agencies is largely a matter of the verbal
propositions of the law it advances.... For those propositions not only become
part of the governing law that other agencies must at the very least appear
to obey, but also determine what kinds of claims the justices themselves will
subject to their attitudes in the future.

S.

WASBY. THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

62 (1970).
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influenced the ways in which other disciplinary sanctions are imposed
by providing a basis for predicting, rightly or wrongly, what due process
means for such actions. Goss may also have influenced both the development of alternative sanctions and elections by school administrators among
available disciplinary alternatives.
These applications of judicial decisions cannot be explained by a
command theory of law. Nevertheless, they are based upon law in a sense
that cannot well be doubted and should not be ignored. The activity of
anticipation, which reflects the most common business of working lawyers
and of laymen who apply the law to themselves, must be considered in
dealing with the behavior that results from legal action even if the causal
relationships are more obscure and normative evaluation is more
problematic.
CONCLUSION
This study reveals a variety of responses by state and local school
officials to regulation of student disciplinary procedures. From a legal
effectiveness perspective, practices in the sample schools seem consistent
with state law requirements and, if coincidentally, with the limited rules
announced by Supreme Court decision. This observation, however, reflects
little of the complex pattern observed in the sample schools. It covers,
for example, only one aspect of the procedure for expulsion used in Indiana.
That procedure, which resembles the process for trying criminal cases
far more closely than usual notions of administrative hearings, does constitute a set of legislative commands to local schools, but is at least equally
important as a response to Supreme Court and lower court due process
decisions. It is, moreover, a particular kind of response: one that relies
on existing but not conclusive authority to reach a "safe" result. Although
the legislature might have left procedures at a more informal level, it
elected rather to insure the legal validity of its process by eliminating
virtually all elements of informality. In doing so, the legislature acted
as any businessman or private person who, when faced with uncertainty
in the applicable law, balances risk and advantage. The choice of "safe"
results, keeping far from the margin of what the law seems to require,
cannot be explained in terms of obedience to commands, because existing
commands do not reach that far, nor is there reason to think they will
require everything that Indiana has provided.
Moreover, legal effectiveness tells us little about the expulsion procedures used at the local level. It does appear that, when expulsion is
used, the required procedures are followed. This is important, but is only
one aspect of what occurs in practice. A number of schools encourage
withdrawal by children over sixteen and employ program transfers for
students who might otherwise be expelled. Ordinary notions of compliance
are of little help in evaluating these alternative strategies, because the
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statutory rules on expulsion do not clearly govern withdrawals or program
transfers. It is not more useful to talk in terms of "avoidance" and
"evasion." The latter notion cannot be applied because the illegality of
using these practices for children who engage in serious or repeated
misconduct is far from clear. The notion of "avoidance" is even less helpful
in this connection. If there are legally permissible strategies for dealing
with such children (e.g., withdrawal or transfer), and these are used, the
law dealing with other strategies (i.e., expulsion) is neither effective nor
ineffective when the former are used. The link between rules for expulsion
and resort to different sanctions is not one of obedience or disobedience
to commands, but of preference for using a less regulated alternative that
is arguably available. Here, as with legislative action, school officials are
anticipating and applying to themselves rules on the extension of legal
commands in a way that legal effectiveness theory does not capture.
The same points obtain for in-school suspension, the recent but single
most common form of discipline reported in our sample schools. Legal
effectiveness notions do not advance our understanding of this practice
to any significant degree, except on an hypothesized and doubtful assumption that in-school and out-of-school suspensions must be treated alike for
constitutional purposes. However, the popularity of this device for
handling misbehaving students rests at least partially on the use of law
by school officials in precisely the same way that lawyers use law to advise
their clients and that judges interpret previous authority in deciding
pending disputes.
Accordingly, the criticisms of traditional legal effectiveness research,
articulated by a number of social and political scientists during the last
ten years or so, seem borne out by this study. As a tenable theory of
law must take account of self-application of law by laymen and of anticipation by laymen and lawyers alike, so an adequate theory of behavioral
response to law must ultimately include these activities within its purview.

